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It is today beyond genuine dispute that the Soviet authorities systemat-
ically intern dissenters in mental institutions. Through dissident sources,
Amnesty International has learned in some detail of 305 cases of such
internment between 1969 and 1983.1 Other sources report more than
500 "well-authenticated cases" from 1962 through 1983.2 The total
number of interned dissenters, however, may actually be much higher.
In 1981, a senior official in the Soviet Ministry of Health told a nation-
wide congress of psychiatrists that 1.2 percent of admissions at one Mos-
cow mental institution were "in connection with visits to State agencies
to present groundless complaints and slanderous statements."'3 Based on
estimates of the total number of patients in Soviet psychiatric hospitals,
some have figured from this revelation that up to 6000 persons nation-
wide may be interned for acts of dissent.4
The types of dissent which have led to criminal and civil psychiatric
internment in the Soviet Union may be divided into five catagories: (1)
expression of unauthorized ideological, social, or cultural views (these
represent the largest proportion); (2) agitation for greater national rights
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1. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, POLITICAL ABUSE OF PSYCHIATRY IN THE U.S.S.R.: AN
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL BRIEFING 3-4 (1983) (120 cases in 1969-75, 100 cases in 1975-79,
and 85 cases in 1979-83).
2. S. BLOCH & P. REDDAWAY, SOVIET PSYCHIATRIC ABUSE: THE SHADOW OVER
WORLD PSYCHIATRY 30, 73 (1984). Similarly, Ludmilla Thorne, who tracks news from Soviet
dissident movements for Freedom House, reported in late 1983 that she knew of 215 dissenters
confined within psychiatric hospitals at that time. Thorne, Philosophical Intoxications and
Other Soviet Ailments, FREEDOM AT ISSUE, Sept.-Oct. 1983, at 21.
3. INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION ON POLITICAL USE OF PSYCHIATRY [hereinafter
IAPUP], INFORMATION BULL. No. 2, Oct. 1981, at 10 (quoting from paper presented in May
1981 to 7th All-Union Congress of Psychiatrists and Neuropathologists).
4. See American Psychiatric Association, The International Response to Psychiatric




and autonomy in education, language, and culture, as well as in political
and economic administration (within this category Lithuanian and
Ukrainian nationalists have been the most active); (3) requests or at-
tempts to emigrate; (4) religious activism (Buddhist, Jewish, Baptist, and
Pentecostalist); and (5) persistent pressing of complaints upon the au-
thorities.5 Methods of activism that have precipitated internments in-
clude: making protests to officials in writing or in person; writing open
letters; samizdat circulation of bulletins, journals, essays, or books; form-
ing unapproved organizations; protest demonstrations (rare); and at-
tempts to enter foreign embassies or cross Soviet borders.6
It also appears beyond dispute that a substantial proportion of dissi-
dents who have been psychiatrically interned are, by Western standards,
mentally healthy or only mildly disturbed and not in need of involuntary
hospitalization. A number of one-time internees who later emigrated to
the United States and Western Europe have been examined by Western
clinicians and found free of diagnosable mental illness.7 In 1978, a prom-
inent British psychiatrist on a private visit to the U.S.S.R. examined nine
dissenters-including some former psychiatric internees-who feared fu-
ture commitments. He reported that while four of the nine displayed
evidence of mild psychopathology, he found no evidence justifying com-
mitment.8 Moreover, two dissident Soviet psychiatrists, in coordination
with the Moscow-based Working Commission to Investigate the Use of
Psychiatry for Political Purposes, examined more than fifty dissenters
between 1977 and 1981. 9 Their evaluations, which were in accord with
5. S. BLOCH & P. REDDAWAY, PSYCHIATRIC TERROR 263-72 (1977).
6. Id.
7. Perhaps the leading case is that of Pyotr Grigorenko, a former Soviet army major gen-
eral, whose criticism in the early 1960's of special privileges given to high Party officials began
a career of dissent that led to two psychiatric hospitalizations and the loss of his high army
rank. In 1964 and 1969, following his arrests, two forensic commissions from the Serbsky
Institute for Forensic Psychiatry-the leading Soviet forensic center---diagnosed his case to
involve paranoid psychopathy, complicated by cerebral arteriosclerosis, and found him crimi-
nally non-responsible. During a 1978 visit to his son in the United States, he was stripped of
his citizenship by the Supreme Soviet and then granted asylum by the U.S. In 1979, he was
examined by a team of well-known psychiatric, neurological, and psychological consultants
from Columbia, Harvard, and Yale Universities. Applying conventional American criteria,
these clinicians found him to be without a diagnosable mental disorder, although they did note
"signs of mild depression," as well as some sensory and motor impairment, probably second-
ary to a 1972 stroke. Reich, The Case of General Grigorenko, ENCOUNTER, Apr. 1980, at 9.
8. S. BLOCH & P. REDDAWAY, supra note 2, at 137 (citing LoW-BEER, REPORT TO THE
ROYAL COLLEGE OF PSYCHIATRISTS (1978)).
9. IAPUP, INFORMATION BULL. No. 1, May 1981, at 13. The Working Commission, a
panel of seven activists affiliated with the Moscow Helsinki Group, prepared more than 1500
pages of documentation on several hundred cases of internment during its four-year tenure.
Founded in 1977, principally through the efforts of Alexander Podrabinek, the Commission
investigated and reported in detail on legal and psychiatric treatment of dissidents. It also
lobbied Soviet doctors and government officials, as well as foreign organizations, in an effort to
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Western standards and won high praise from American and European
psychiatric organizations, 10 likewise discerned no psychopathology be-
lieved to justify either civil or criminal commitment.II
The involuntary confinement of dissidents in mental institutions in the
Soviet Union has produced an outpouring of criticism in the West.12 It is
a remarkable feature of this criticism, however, that it largely operates
from an assumption of "simple evil." In essence, this view presumes that
absolute, apolitical standards exist for the diagnosis of mental disorders
justifying involuntary commitment, and that Soviet psychiatrists con-
sciously and cynically breach these diagnostic and ethical principles by
participating in the hospitalization of dissidents whom Western doctors
would find mentally healthy. In this view, any claimed theoretical justifi-
cation for such practices is mere pseudoscience and conscious fraud.
Some adherents to this view acknowledge, with a nod to Thomas Szasz
and psychiatry's other radical critics,' 3 that the process of diagnosis is
"closely intertwined with social factors" and that there are "sometimes
considerable differences among various cultures . . . in the clinical ap-
proach to [certain] patterns of behaviour .... ,14 Yet instead of ex-
ploring the possibility that political dissent might be one such "pattern of
behavior," they avoid this troubling question in favor of a simpler formu-
lation: social and cultural differences render psychiatry vulnerable to
"sinister" misuse for "non-medical" reasons, such that "patients lose
paramountcy."15
In this Article, I will contend that the prevailing image of the Soviet
psychiatrist as a soulless flunky or scheming thug, obedient to devious
marshal pressure against psychiatric internments. The psychiatrist Alexander Voloshanovich,
a member of the Commission, prepared 41 evaluations of dissidents who feared psychiatric
internment before he emigrated in 1978. Over the next three years, a successor, Dr. Anatoly
Koryagin, performed 16 more evaluations. In 1980, as part of a broad crackdown on all dissi-
dent movements, the authorities began arresting the Commission's members. By mid-1981,
all, including Koryagin, had been convicted and sentenced, and the Commission had been
disbanded. Id. at 13-18; see also S. BLOCH & P. REDDAWAY, supra note 2, at 75-110.
10. See S. BLOCH & P. REDDAWAY, supra note 2, at 82, 149-53.
11. Dr. Alexander Voloshanovich, who performed most of the evaluations, see supra note
9, concluded that some of the examinees suffered from "apparent personality disorders" but
that none needed compulsory hospitalization. See Voloshanovich, Psychiatry in the USSR: An
Insider's View from the Outside, MED. & HUM. RTs.: BULL. OF AMNESTY INT'L. BRIT. MED.
GROUP, Feb. 1982, at 17-18.
12. See, e.g., AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 1; S. BLOCH & P. REDDAWAY, supra
note 5; H. FIRESIDE, SOVIET PSYCHOPRISONS (1979).
13. See T. SzAsz, THE MYTH OF MENTAL ILLNESS: FOUNDATIONS OF A THEORY OF
PERSONAL CONDUCT (1961); see also RADICAL PSYCHOLOGY (P. Brown ed. 1973).
14. S. BLOCH & P. REDDAWAY, supra note 2, at 13-14. The authors mention homosexual-
ity and drug and alcohol use as examples.




KGB mentors, represents a grossly inadequate understanding of why dis-
senters are systematically interned in Soviet mental hospitals. More
plausibly, I will argue, the typical Soviet clinician involved in such in-
ternments acts with no less sincere a belief in the clinical and ethical
rightness of her actions than does an American counterpart in forensic
work. Finally, I will suggest that the probability that Soviet psychiatrists
act out of genuine commitment to a system of theory and ethics rooted in
value preferences alien to the pluralist West has important implications
for the strategies of Western human rights activists in international fora.
Part I will explore ethical dilemmas inherent in the practice of psychi-
atry in any society. Part II will discuss the historical and theoretical
sources of modern Soviet psychiatry's political authority. Part III will
consider how the mechanics of the Soviet legal system invite the suppres-
sion of dissent through involuntary psychiatric commitment. Part IV
will analyze current Soviet psychiatric theories and their intrinsic polit-
ical content; it will then explore how this content is expressed in forensic
practice, resulting in involuntary commitment practices that are shock-
ingly repressive by Western standards. Finally, Part V will discuss some
implications of this analysis for international human rights activity
aimed at Soviet psychiatric internment of dissidents. Only by better
comprehending, and taking seriously, the value premises implicit in So-
viet psychiatric theory and forensic practice can we sharpen our moral
critique of what the Soviets do and heighten our insight into human
rights problems that theories and technologies of the mind can pose for
all societies.
I. Determinism and Responsibility: Some Preliminary Ethical
Considerations
A. Early Uses of Medicine to Repress Dissent
Throughout most of the Europe of 1484, churchmen and freembn
could sense an atmosphere of rising social tension and religious ferment.
Thirty-three years were still to pass before a disconsolate Wittenberg
cleric would nail to the doors of a castle chapel his shocking challenge to
the Church's secular authority. Yet a rising class of tradesmen and
merchants was already questioning scholastic views on worldly affairs,
and a Renaissance ethos of emerging individualism was nurturing newly
critical attitudes toward Church dogma.16 On December 9, 1484, Pope
Innocent VIII moved decisively in response. The Papal Bull he issued
16. See R. TAWNEY, RELIGION AND THE RISE OF CAPITALISM 11-115 (1926).
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noted "with the most heartfelt anxiety" and "bitter sorrow" that many
"unmindful of their own salvation and straying from the Catholic Faith,
have abandoned themselves to devils; incubi; and succubi .... -17 An
alarming rise in witchcraft was to blame for this "heretical depravity,"
and the Bull enjoined that an army of Inquisitors be empowered to
search out and destroy its practitioners. 8
Although campaigns against witches had been waged irregularly for
more than two centuries, the new Inquisition was at first stymied by a
lack of systematic criteria for the mass identification of these challengers
to faith and order. An enterprising pair of medically-inclined Dominican
friars proposed a curious solution to this dilemma of applied theology.
In a 1486 treatise, Malleus Maleficarum, they articulated a vision of
witchcraft as a demonically-triggered medical illness, to be diagnosed by
the careful scrutiny of clinical signs, symptoms, and diagnostic test re-
sults. Physicians, they contended, ought to be responsible for making the
"diagnosis." Buttressed by clinical case reports19 and complete with a
theory of pathogenesis2° and a detailed discussion of symptoms, signs, 21
and useful diagnostic tests, 22 the Dominicans' approach struck a reso-
nant pitch in a society largely committed to its faith, yet newly intrigued
by critical rationality. Inquisitors throughout Europe rapidly embraced
it.23
17. THE MALLEUS MALEFICARUM OF HEINRICH KRAMER AND JAMES SPRENGER xliii
(M. Summers ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as H. KRAMER & J. SPRENGER].
18. Id. atxliii-iv.
19. These Dominican friars marshalled case histories in support of numerous clinical prin-
ciples. Thomas Szasz cites one example-the rule that sudden, dramatic onset of illness in one
person is typically a product of another's witchcraft. "A certain well-born citizen of Spires,"
the Dominicans reported, had a wife of "obstinate disposition" who "refused in nearly every
way to comply with his wishes." During a quarrel, the authors claimed, she "loudly swore
that, unless he beat her, there was no honesty or faithfulness in him." He then
stretched out his hand, not intending to hurt her, and struck her lightly with his open
palm on the buttock; whereupon he suddenly fell to the ground and lost all his sense, and
lay in bed for many weeks afflicted with a most grievous illness. Now it was obvious that
this was not a natural illness, but caused by some witchcraft of the woman.
T. SzAsz, THE MANUFACTURE OF MADNESS 8-9 (1970) (quoting H. KRAMER & J.
SPRENGER, supra note 17, at 87).
20. "Carnal lust" was the root cause of all witchcraft; thus most witches were female be-
cause lust "is in women insatiable." H. KRAMER & J. SPRENGER, supra note 17, at 47.
21. Physical signs included such common dermatologic features as moles, scars, hemangi-
omas, and supernumerary nipples; all were regarded as "devil's privy marks," proof of a pact
with Satan. T. SzAsz, supra note 19, at 32.
22. "Witch-pricking" was one such tool. Invisible "witch spots," bloodless and insensi-
tive to pain, were believed to be proof of a pact with Satan. Physicians probed for such "spots"
by inserting long needles into suspects' flesh, monitoring for bleeding and cries of pain. Id. at
33.
23. H. KRAMER & J. SPRENGER, supra note 17, at viii.
Soviet Psychiatry
For the first time in history physicians were established in the role of
"diagnosing" dissent against an established order.24 At witch trials,
medical testimony was decisive. And if a medieval physician felt trou-
bled by any sense of conflict between his identity as a healer and his legal
role in condemning "patients" to be burned alive, he could comfort him-
self with the authoritative reassurance of the Malleus Maleficarum that
"whatever is done for the safety of the State is merciful. '25
The central role of physicians in the "diagnosis" of witchcraft during
the twilight years of feudalism is troubling early evidence of the potential
power of clinical classification as an instrument of social control.26 Nor
were the first clinicians to move beyond religious conceptions of madness
to secular and materialist theories shy about urging medical explanations
and treatment for political dissent. Dr. Benjamin Rush, a signer of the
Declaration of Independence and generally acknowledged as the father
of American psychiatry, claimed that colonists opposed to the.rebellion
against the Crown suffered from a mental sickness-"revolutiona"-for
which the "cure" was simply to switch sides.27 Rush explained the post-
war spirit of hostility to creation of a strong central government as an-
other illness--"a form of insanity which I shall take the liberty of distin-
gnishing by the name of anarchia.' '28
There is no evidence that such theories were used to suppress dissent.
They illustrate, however, two themes central to the current debate over
the alleged political abuses of the mental health professions: the use of
24. Challengers to theologic orthodoxy, particularly from those with an interest in scien-
tific experimentation, were especially vulnerable to the "diagnosis" of witchcraft. See generally
M. MURRAY, THE WITCH-CULT IN WESTERN EUROPE (1921); C. WILLIAMS, WITCHCRAFT
(1941). The early psychiatrists, however, beginning with Benjamin Rush, reinterpreted witch-
craft as mental illness. T. SzAsz, supra note 19, at 68-74. A leading historian of psychology,
Gregory Zilboorg, has argued that the mass witch-hunts triggered by the Papal Bull of 1484
and the Malleus Maleficarum were motivated largely by the growing insecurity of feudal reli-
gious and secular authorities and that most accused witches were, in fact, mentally ill. See
generally G. ZILBOORG & G. HENRY, A HISTORY OF MEDICAL PSYCHOLOGY (1941).
25. H. KRAMER & J. SPRENGER, supra note 17, at 231.
26. In the 16th century, during the height of the witch-hunting era, opposition to the
diagnosis and burning of witches was weak and was itself considered a symptom of witchcraft.
T. SzAsz, supra note 19, at 8. But 17th century clerics, physicians, and lawyers began to
challenge the evidence and verdicts in witch trials, charging that such "signs" as privy marks,
see supra note 21, were natural characteristics of most people; that confessions were frequently
extracted by torture; and that evidence was often fraudulent. Id. at 32, 298-99. These early
dissenters braved arrest and trial by Catholic and Protestant authorities, but by the mid-18th
century the era of witch-hunts had been brought to an end by secular authorities despite linger-
ing religious objections. Id. at 298-302. See generally R. ROBBINS, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
WITCHCRAFT AND DEMONOLOGY (1959).
27. D. BOORSTIN, THE LOST WORLD OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 182 (1948).
28. Id. at 182. The principle symptom was an "excess of the passion for liberty, inflamed
by the successful issue of the war," leading to "opinions and conduct which could not be
removed by reason .... " Id.
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diagnosis to discredit the dissenter and her ideas, and the use of treat-
ment aimed at the "cure" of recantation.
B. The Political Context of Therapy
Wherever clinicians have amassed considerable cultural authority29 as
arbiters of health and disease, medicine has been a significant source of
social norms. This function of medicine is ultimately circular, however,
for the clinicians' norms inevitably reflect those of their patrons.
Whether a system of therapeutic thought is built on notions of science or
of the supernatural, its clinical raw materials are the complaints and cues
of those who seek assistance. These complaints and cues reflect a subjec-
tive sense of what is deviant and unpleasant, and thus fit for therapeutic
action. Such is the case whether a complainant is worried about crushing
chest pain, the shape of his nose, or a co-worker's ideas. The therapeutic
agent imputes meaning to a complaint by measuring it against her sense
of what is normal. This sense is shaped in large part by professional and
life experiences-prior medical complaints and other social cues-which
reflect cultural ideas about what is and is not sufficiently deviant and
unpleasant to merit intervention. In virtually any modem society, the
life-threatening nature of crushing chest pain will seem to deserve inter-
vention. But the form of a complainant's nose, or of a co-worker's ideas,
may or may not be so viewed, depending on the cultural context.
Thus, a society's clinicians could be considered as passive agents of
deterministic cultural forces, rather than as willing social regulators. Yet
surely this cannot be the complete story, for it would deprive the doer of
any individual responsibility for her deed. Unless the precept of individ-
ual responsibility is to be preserved, it can make no sense to consider, as
an international human rights issue, the political use of diagnostic and
therapeutic approaches to mental illness. For otherwise any "abuse"
would be merely the mechanistic consequence of a system of social
norms comprehensible in value-free social science terms, without refer-
ence to individual rights or responsibility. 30
29. See P. STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE (1982) (dis-
cussion of how physicians amass "cultural authority" over illness and health).
30. As Hannah Arendt has written,
We have become very much accustomed by modem psychology and sociology, not to
speak of modem bureaucracy, to explaining away the responsibility of the doer for his
deed in terms of this or that kind of determinism. Whether such seemingly deeper expla-
nations of human actions are right or wrong is debatable. But what is not debatable is
that no judicial procedure would be possible on the basis of them, and that the administra-
tion of justice, measured by such theories, is an extremely unmodem, not to say out-
moded, institution.




That, surely, would be determinism run amok. No society could per-
mit its cherished beliefs that people have basic rights-civil and political,
or social and economic-to be eviscerated by such a mechanistic expla-
nation. Preservation of such beliefs, however, demands that value
choices be made to delineate the deeds for which individuals ought to be
held morally accountable, irrespective of the explanatory force of cul-
tural or other determinism.
Human rights activists make such choices, either openly or implicitly,
when they condemn the use of psychiatry as an instrument of political
repression. The "simple evil" theory, however, implies that no such
choices are necessary in order to condemn Soviet psychiatric diagnosis
and internment of dissenters. Rather, the theory assumes that value-free,
clinical criteria exist and make possible a neutral assessment of Soviet
psychiatric practices. It has been urged, for example, that the correct
"clinical meaning" of "socially dangerous" as a criterion for civil com-
mitment is physical dangerousness to oneself or others.31 A commitment
is clinically improper and thus a human rights violation, by this line of
reasoning, if this "clinical meaning" is supplanted by a broader, politi-
cally-charged "judicial meaning" that "the patient was capable of harm-
ing the social system as a whole." 32 Indeed, a virtually unanimous
international consensus holds that it is justifiable to deprive mentally dis-
turbed persons of their liberty because of physical dangerousness to
others or to themselves. Such unanimity represents agreement on values,
however, and is thus no less intrinsically political-albeit less controver-
sial-than the view that expression of ideas that challenge a social order
is socially dangerous.
More broadly, political bias is inherent in the very concept of mental
illness. All diagnostic and therapeutic activities have political impact.33
To acknowledge this, one need not embrace the radical critique of the
concept of mental illness as a repressive myth invented solely to suppress
undesired behavior.34 Anna Freud once complained: "Young people
. . . see that what psychoanalysis may lead to is adaptation to society,
and that is the last thing they have in mind. ' 35 This biological vision of
health as homeostasis implies a therapeutic technology which, like Au-
gustinian theology, urges individuals to accept social structure as fate.36
31. See, e.g., Koryagin, Unwilling Patients, LANCET 821, 822 (1981).
32. Id.
33. See, e.g., S. HALLECK, THE PoLITIcs OF THERAPY (1971).
34. See, e.g., T. SzAsz, supra note 13 (most prominent exposition of the radical critique).
35. N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1982, § 1, at 46, col. 1.
36. This is not necessarily all bad. As one believer in the homeostasis model has observed,
its radical critics, such as Thomas Szasz and R. D. Laing, tend to discount the human anguish
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The natural political effect of diagnosis and treatment is, under any social
system, the nurturing of conservatism, whether or not this is the practi-
tioners' conscious end.37 Thus, if persons are to be held responsible for
intending the natural consequences of their acts, everything mental
health professionals do is political in intent.
To condemn the Soviet conceptualization of dissent as dangerous dis-
ease, while accepting the diagnosis and treatment of-say-manic behavior,
is to recognize some line between intolerable and acceptable political
functions of psychiatry. Such a line cannot be discerned by logical de-
duction from neutral truth. It must be drawn via the assertion of pre-
ferred values. Human rights norms are nothing more than agreed-upon
value preferences. 38 Thus, the attempt to draw such a line, when consid-
ering a given psychiatric practice, is a coherent human rights enterprise.
II. The Historical and Theoretical Roots of Modem
Soviet Psychiatry
A. Historical Roots
Sidney Bloch and Peter Reddaway, who have written the most exten-
sive account of the Soviet political use of psychiatry, trace Russian
abuses back to the Pyotr Chaadayev affair of 1836. Chaadayev, a promi-
nent philosopher, wrote a commentary critical of Tsar Nicholas I's re-
gime and was promptly denounced by Nicholas himself for purveying "a
farrago of insolent nonsense."' 39 Nicholas, perhaps reluctant to appear
crudely repressive after a recent relaxation of censorship, 40 responded
with a curious gambit. Instead of "punishing" Chaadayev in a conven-
tional sense, Nicholas declared that the philosopher deserved "sympa-
thy," for he suffered from "derangement and insanity. '4 1 "Taking into
so often associated with failure or unwillingness to adapt to one's social setting. G. VAIL-
LANT, ADAPTATION TO LIFE: How THE BEST AND THE BRIGHTEST CAME OF AGE 362
(1977).
37. Thus, as Vaillant observes, Thoreau and Gandhi would have scored poorly in the lead-
ing prospective psychiatric study of life adjustment. Id. at 358. "If you have not the strength
to accept the terms life offers you," Vaillant pronounces, "you must, in self-defense, force your
own terms upon it. If either you or your environment is distorted too much in the process,
your effort at adaptation may be labeled mental illness." Id. at 13.
38. See generally M. McDouGAL, H. LASSWELL & L. CHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND
WORLD PU3LIC ORDER (1980) (attempt to build a theory of human rights out of "widely
shared" values)..
39. S. BLOCH & P. REDDAWAY, supra note 5, at 48.
40. Chodoff, "1984": Utopias, Dystopias, and Psychiatry, 12 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCH-OANALY-
SlS 459, 462 (1984).
41. S. BLOCH & P. REDDAWAY, supra note 5, at 48 (quoting Z. MEDVEDEV & R.




consideration the unwell state of this unfortunate person," the Tsar an-
nounced, "the government in its solicitude and fatherly concern for its
subject, forbids him to leave the house and will provide free medical
care." 42 The Tsar, as Bloch and Reddaway note, thereby not only put a
troublesome dissident out of action, but also discredited the dissident's
critique.43
This medical approach to dissent was rarely employed during tsarist
and early Bolshevik times.44 Psychiatric internment of political personae
non gratae did not become a regular practice until the Stalinist purges of
the 1930's.45 During the Stalinist era, moveover, psychiatrists' motives
for committing dissidents may have been largely humanistic.46 Condi-
tions in mental hospitals were relatively mild compared with Stalinist
penal camps. Ex-internees have reported that psychiatrists sought to use
their diagnostic authority in order to spare the internees the brutalities of
the Gulag.47
B. Theoretical Roots
By the end of the Stalinist era, however, Soviet psychiatrists had devel-
oped an elaborate theoretical scheme to justify the forced hospitalization
of dissidents. This scheme had roots in both the revolutionary optimism
of the triumphant Bolsheviks and the traditional Russian propensity to
view individuals' challenges to authority as something unnatural. 48
Upon assuming power, the Bolsheviks set out to marshal mental health
professionals for a grand campaign to formulate a new science of the
mind. Grounded in the dialectical materialism of Marx and Engels, the
new mental science was to play a pivotal role in the creation of the New
Soviet Man, wholly committed to communist values and unafflicted by
individualistic, bourgeois psychic drives.49 Crime and mental illness,
42. Id. Chaadeyev was detained at home for a year.
43. Id. at 49.
44. Id. at 49-51.
45. Id. at 51-58.
46. Id. at 53 (citing a former internee). Bloch and Reddaway report that information on
psychiatric internment during the Stalinist era is scanty. Id. at 51.
47. Id. at 53. After an inspection tour of the Serbsky Institute for Forensic Psychiatry, a
1948 Party commission complained that the internees' regime was not severe enough and that
too many were ruled not responsible. Id. at 53-54 (quoting a former internee). See !so M.
Field, Commitment for Commitment: The Soviet Psychiatric Shunt 2 (unpublished paper pre-
pared for Fifth Int'l Conference on Social Science and Medicine, 1977) (cited with permission
of the author) (copy on file with the Yale Journal of International Law).
48. See H. SETON-WATSON, THE DECLINE OF IMPERIAL RUSSIA 22-24 (1952). See also
infra notes 305-09 and accompanying text.
49. See R. WOODWORTH & M. SHEEHAN, CONTEMPORARY SCHOOLS OF PSYCHOLOGY
90-94 (1964); Galach'yan, Soviet Psychiatry, in PSYCHIATRY IN THE COMMUNIST WORLD 29
(A. Kiev ed. 1968).
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along with all other social problems, were to disappear with the elimina-
tion of class conflict and the achievement of pure communism.50
Accordingly, Soviet psychiatrists rejected the Freudian conception of
man as inexorably driven by instinctual needs. 51 Not only were Freudi-
anism's pessimistic implications an anathema to Soviet scientists deter-
mined to remake human nature, but psychoanalytic models of symptom
formation were "blindly speculative, idealistic constructs" that ignored
neurophysiological reality and thus had "nothing in common with the
philosophic methodology of dialectical materialism. ' 52 This methodol-
ogy required a unity between the conceptual and the material-between
the mental and the neurophysiological.5 3
During the first few decades of Bolshevik rule, Soviet scientists strug-
gled in vain to formulate such a synthesis. Several theorists were briefly
embraced, appointed to high academic positions, and then sacked.54 But
a combination of classic scientific serendipity and aggressive intellectual
entrepreneurship eventually produced a solution that the Party more per-
manently enshrined.
1. The Pavlovian Model
The story of Ivan Pavlov's accidental discovery of the conditioned re-
flex is a legend in biomedical science. The Soviet physiologist's studies of
salivary secretions in dogs were stymied by a nagging problem: his tech-
nicians could not determine the baseline (fasting) secretion rate because
salivation increased when they approached the animals to make measure-
ments. Pavlov knew that the salivary reflex was triggered naturally by
the stimulus of food on the tongue, and he noted that the technicians
were also responsible for feeding the dogs. He theorized that an associa-
tion between feeding and arrival of a technician conditioned a salivary
response to the technician's arrival itself. His famous experiment, in
which attendants rang a bell with each feeding and discovered that after
several feedings the bell alone elicited the salivary reflex, confirmed his
theory. More generally, he concluded, "a stimulus that originally did not
elicit the response does so after having been repeatedly a part of the situa-
tion to which the response was made."' 55 He carried the theory further,
concluding that conditioning could also occur when the stimulus
50. Chodoff, supra note 40, at 463.
51. Galach'yan, supra note 49, at 39.
52. Id.
53. See R. WOODWORTH & M. SHEEHAN, supra note 49, at 90-91.
54. See id. at 91-94.




remained the same but a new response was substituted, as when a child,
instead of pointing to an object, learns to call it by name.5 6
This model of learning, with its optimistic implication that natural
stimulus-response connections could be remodeled without limit, became
the foundation for a Soviet theory of mental life. Pavlov satisfied the
requirements of dialectical materialism by linking this model with a puta-
tive neurophysiological mechanism. 57 He proposed boldly that associa-
tion via the conditioned reflex was the basic element of all thought,
knowledge, and insight.58 His synthesis resonated with the Marxist-Len-
inist conception of consciousness as something present "only in social-
ized human beings" and something which "has evolved historically in
dependence on man's labor and social organization [an amalgam of con-
ditioned stimuli and responses]. '59 Soviet psychiatrists designed institu-
tional regimens and approaches to individual patients based on this
synthesis. 60 In 1950, Pavlov was "politically canonized" at a joint ses-
sion of the Soviet Academies of Sciences and Medical Sciences which was
dedicated to the exposition of orthodox Pavlovian principles and the crit-
icism of deviations. 61 By the close of the Stalinist era, Pavlovian ap-
proaches dominated the field, amidst soaring optimism that the new
mental health technology could create neuronal pathways towards the
communist transformation of man, ending crime, mental illness, and
other social deviance.62
56. Id.
57. Conditioning, Pavlov explained, involved the creation of new neuronal connections:
Any unconditioned. . . stimulus undoubtedly evokes a state of nervous activity in some
definite part of the brain. . . .During the period of excitation of such centers all other
external stimuli which happen to affect the animal are conducted to these centers, and the
paths by which they are conducted through the hemispheres become thereby specially
marked out. This is the only possible interpretation of the facts.
R. WOODWORTH & M. SHEEHAN, supra note 49, at 96 (quoting Pavlov). Pavlov's investiga-
tions, though, afforded no direct test of this physiological hypothesis.
58. "I am fully convinced that thinking is association. . . .Association is knowledge, it is
thinking, and when you make use of it, it is insight . . . ." Id. (quoting Pavlov).
59. Id. at 94.
60. See Galach'yan, supra note 49, at 38.
61. R. WOODWORTH & M. SHEEHAN, supra note 49, at 95.
62. In 1952, a Moscow bureaucrat reportedly boasted to the visiting Adlai Stevenson that
schizophrenia had already been eradicated. Chodoff, supra note 40, at 463. Of course it had
not been, but Soviet psychiatrists seem to have believed that in time, with Pavlovian tech-
niques, it would be. This optimism had an ironic mirror-image in the West, where a post-
Freudian generation of psychoanalysts asserted that an analytic approach could successfully
treat some cases of schizophrenia and other psychoses, a claim that even Freud, who thought
analysis could benefit only non-psychotic patients, would have rejected. See, e.g., H. ROSEN-
FELD, PSYCHOTIC STATES: A PSYCHO-ANALYTIC APPROACH 127 (1965).
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2. Political Implications
In three senses, Pavlovian doctrine encouraged the rise of what Wes-
terners have viewed as the brutal misuse of psychiatry to quash political
dissent. First, the principle that all knowledge, thought, and even insight
is the sum of many elemental conditioned responses suggests an extraor-
dinarily wide role for psychiatrists in the task of socialist construction, a
task that according to Leninist thought requires the silencing of "reac-
tionary," dissenting voices. Second, the Pavlovian conception of "treat-
ment" as reconditioning-the creation of socially desirable neuronal
pathways-undermines Western notions of a distinction between hu-
mane "therapy" and unethical "punishment." New responses can be
conditioned with the help of averse experiences as well as pleasant ones.
Thus a Western human rights activist's "punishment" may be a Soviet
psychiatrist's efficacious "therapy." Third, and perhaps most troubling
for the liberal conscience, the Pavlovian model of the mind as a summa-
tion of conditioned responses renders the dissenter's moral claim to free-
dom meaningless.
Thus, Pavlovian theory lent substantial intellectual force to the devel-
opment of a psychiatric approach to dissent, and was not, as the "simple
evil" theorists assume, merely a cynical rationalization for totalitarian
repression. This conclusion is supported by the political implications dis-
cerned by Western enthusiasts of Pavlov in the conditioned reflex para-
digm. 63 The absence of a systematic psychiatric approach to politically
63. The intellectual journey of John B. Watson, America's leading Pavlovian, illustrates
the Pavlovian model's power even outside the Marxist framework as a basis for the use of
psychology to achieve political ends. Watson embraced the conditioned response as the basic
building block of all thought, emotion, and behavior-indeed of the "complete personality."
See E. HEIDBREDER, supra note 55, at 250, 254. Like the Soviet psychiatrists, he rejected the
Freudian model and the significance of instinctual drives. Id. at 255. In an oft-quoted state-
ment, he boasted:
Give me a dozen healthy infants, well-formed, and my own specified world to bring them
up in and I'll guarantee to take any one at random and train him to become any type of
specialist I might select-doctor, lawyer, artist, merchant-chief and, yes, even beggar-man
and thief, regardless of his talents, penchants, tendencies, abilities, vocations, and race of
his ancestors.
J. WATSON, BEHAVIORISM 82 (1925).
Nor did Watson, like the Soviets, shy away from the political consequences of the radical
environmental determinism of the Pavlovian paradigm. Freedom was an illusion, he main-
tained. This theme was more fully developed in a popular book by Watson's best-known fol-
lower. See B. SKINNER, BEYOND FREEDOM AND DIGNITY (1971). Human choices were the
mechanistic products of conditioning. The grand political question was whether man would be
content with the "freedom of the libertine"-the product of an uncontrolled environment-or
would exploit the technology of conditioning to bring up children "in behavioristic freedom-a
freedom which we cannot even picture in words, so little do we know of it." E. HEIDBREDER,
supra note 55, at 257 (quoting Watson). Asked Watson rhetorically: "Will not these children
in turn, with their better ways of living and thinking, replace us as a society, and in turn bring
up their children in a still more scientific way, until the world finally becomes a place fit for




undesirable behavior in Eastern Europe" and the Peoples' Republic of
China, 65 where the Pavlovian paradigm made little headway, underlines
the importance of Pavlovian theory in the emergence of a psychiatric
approach to Soviet dissent. For Soviet psychiatrists, Pavlovian principles
were hardly a consciously cynical cover for totalitarian repression.
Rather, they had genuine scientific appeal-and their own inevitable,
anti-liberal political implications.
at 112; Scheflin, Freedom of the Mind as an International Human Rights Issue, 3 HuM. RTS.
L.J. 1, 22-23 (1982).
64. There have been sporadic reports of psychiatric internments of dissidents in Eastern
Europe. With the exception of a 1974 report of a Catholic priest's pre-trial detention in a
mental hospital following complaints of police persecution, see S. BLOCH & P. REDDAWAY,
supra note 5, at 465, there were no reports of political psychiatric commitments in Poland until
the recent crackdown against the Solidarity trade union. But in 1982, an appeal reached the
West from four martial law internees who reported they had been transferred to a psychiatric
ward specializing in alcoholism. "None of us," the four asserted, "has ever needed psychiatric
care." IAPUP, INFORMATION BULL. No. 5, Oct. 1982, at 11-12. In Yugoslavia, a few cases
of involuntary commitment for political activity have been reported. IAPUP, INFORMATION
BULL. No. 4, June 1982, at 7-8 (recounting commitment of two dissenters). A number of
internments of dissidents have been reported in Romania as well. See IAPUP, INFORMATION
BULL. No. 6, Mar. 1983, at 17-18. In Czechoslovakia,- the official Handbook of Criminal Law
contains an article by a Security Services physician describing an illness termed "reforming
paranoia." "Symptoms" include failure to vote (for the Party's choice), possession of forbidden
literature, and expression of inappropriate opinions. At least one dissident has been psychiatri-
cally interned on this ground. IAPUP, INFORMATION BULL. No. 8, Feb. 1984, at 4. The only
reported case in Hungary is that of a lawyer critical of the regime since the 1956 uprising.
Twice in 1981-82 he was arrested and interned in a mental hospital for three-week periods
after declaring hunger strikes and other activities in support of Poland's Solidarity union and
its Hungarian backers. Each time, he was force-fed and administered the antipsychotic drug
haloperidol, although his psychiatric diagnosis is unclear from the available reports. IAPUP,
INFORMATION BULL. No. 3, Mar. 1982, at 7; IAPUP, INFORMATION BULL. No. 6, Mar.
1983, at 18. For two earlier, sporadic reports of political abuse of psychiatry in Eastern Eu-
rope, see S. BLOCH & P. REDDAWAY, supra note 5, at 465.
65. There appear to be no reports of Soviet-style psychiatric internments in the PRC. This
may reflect the very limited role of mental health professionals and institutions in China.
They treat only overtly psychotic or otherwise severely disabled patients; for those less severely
troubled, local cadres "prescribe" political education, job training, and employment. See In-
terviews with several Ministry of Health officials, in Peking (July, 1979) (copy on file with the
author). But the unique program of szu-hsiang kai-tsao (thought reform), conducted by non-
medical personnel in penal institutions, has been the primary tool against political dissent since
the inception of the communist system in China. The key elements of the program are the use
of alternating harsh and humane living conditions and intense emotional and intellectual pres-
sure by peers, to convince a prisoner to acknowledge his ideological "errors" and "reeducate"
him in the values and beliefs of the new communist man. See generally R. LIFTON, THOUGHT
REFORM AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TOTALISM (1963) (psychoanalytic study of Chinese
thought reform program building upon Erik Erikson's concept of identity).
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III. The Legal Framework for Psychiatric Internment
of Soviet Dissidents
A. Khrushchevian Reform
After Stalin's death in 1953, a new, collective leadership embarked on
the most remarkable campaign of reform in Soviet history. At the core
of the wide-ranging program of "de-Stalinization" was a determination
to place Soviet society on a new foundation of "socialist legality."
Scarred by memories of Stalinist brutality and the arbitrariness of the
"cult of personality," Soviet legal reformers, with two related objectives
in mind, set out to redesign the nation's criminal law.
First, they aspired to end the use of criminal process and sanctions as
blunt weapons of class warfare. For Stalin, the primary purpose of the
criminal law was to punish and to deter "enemies of the people."' 66 The
reformers embraced the rehabilitative ideal and called for "preventive
and educational measures which remove those factors contributing to the
appearance of survivals of the past in people's minds." 67 Linked to the
rehabilitative ideal was the therapeutic ideal. As Khrushchev explained:
"A crime is a deviation from the generally recognized standards of be-
havior, frequently caused by mental disorder. ' 68
Second, the reformers hoped to restrain the summary and arbitrary
exercise of administrative and judicial power by drafting a wide range of
safeguards for the criminally accused. They urged an end to Stalinist
secret police tribunals and summary process for political cases. 69 They
also proposed a right to counsel during pre-trial investigation, stricter
rules of evidence, and even a presumption of innocence.70 Moreover,
they pressed for the elimination of the legal doctrine, dating back to
66. Juviler, Some Trends in Soviet Criminal Justice, in SOVIET LAW AFTER STALIN, PART
III: SOVIET INSTITUTIONS AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF LAw 60 (D. Barry, F. Feldbrugge,
G. Ginsburgs & P. Maggs eds. 1979) [hereinafter cited as SOVIET LAw AFrER STALIN].
Juviler also identifies recruitment of forced labor as a prime function of Soviet criminal justice.
Deterring "ordinary" (nonpolitical) crime was a secondary concern. In the Stalinist camps,
persons sentenced for "counterrevolutionary crimes" outnumbered ordinary criminals several
times over. Id. at 59-60.
67. Id. at 61 (quoting a Politburo member). The reformers launched an ambitious pro-
gram designed to transfer much of the responsibility for enforcing "the rules of socialist com-
munity life" from the criminal justice system to informal community groups, including
"general assemblies" of neighbors and volunteer "comrades-courts." Juviler, Criminal Law
and Social Control, in CONTEMPORARY SOVIET LAW 26-35 (D. Barry, W. Butler & G. Gin-
sburgs eds. 1974).
68. S. BLOCH & P. REDDAWAY, supra note 5, at 62.
69. Juviler, supra note 67, at 22.




tsarist times, that empowered judges to convict and to sentence any per-
son believed guilty of a "socially dangerous" act, regardless of whether
the act was specifically defined in the Criminal Code.71
The reform campaign climaxed in 1958 with the enactment of sets of
"Fundamental Principles" of criminal law and procedure, to which the
Union Republics were required to adhere in revamping their criminal
codes. 72 By 1961, all the Republics had dutifully adopted conforming
codes of criminal law and procedure.73 The new codes rejected the old
idea of criminal liability for acts deemed "socially dangerous" yet not
specified by statute,74 and they barred the closed police tribunals and
summary process of the Stalinist era.75 Though they fell far short of
Western, liberal standards of procedural due process and well-crafted
substantive criminal law,76 the codes created a formidable barrier to
the imposition of criminal sanctions without formalized judicial pro-
ceedings. 77
By Soviet standards, then, Khrushchev's law reform campaign pro-
duced a remarkable liberalization. Ironically, this liberalization created
a legal framework for the political use of psychiatry that eventually
aroused widespread condemnation in the West. The collective leadership
of the Khrushchev era remained no less committed than its predecessors
to the Leninist conception of political expression. the only legitimate
function of political expression was to teach and to inspire the masses to
strive toward the Party's vision of socialism. Dissent-even intramural,
Marxist dissent-had no place. The success of the post-Stalin law reform
71. Under this doctrine, known as "Analogy," a judge could convict simply by drawing a
parallel, however far-fetched, between the defendant's act and some crime explicitly defined in
the Code. This, of course, rendered Code definitions, however circumscribed, virtually useless
as safeguards if the defendant's act fit a judge's notion of what was "socially dangerous." See
J. HAZARD, I. SHAPIRO & P. MAGGS, THE SOVIET LEGAL SYSTEM 136-37 (1969).
72. Juviler, supra note 67, at 23.
73. Id.
74. Article 7 of the 1958 General Principles of Criminal Law states:.
As a crime shall be considered, if it is so specified by a criminal statute, any socially
dangerous act (of commission or omission) attacking the Soviet social or political order;
socialist system of economy; socialist property; persons; political, labor, property and
other rights of citizens; as well as any other socially dangerous act attacking the socialist
legal order, ifso specified by a criminal statute.
Cited in K. GRZYBOWSKI, SOVIET LEGAL INSTITUTIONS: DOCTRINES AND SOCIAL FUNC-
TIONS 204 (1962) (emphasis added).
75. Even so, the law reformers got less than they had wanted. Instead of the presumption
of innocence standard that they had sought, for instance, a rule that was adopted placed the
burden of proof upon the prosecution. Juviler, supra note 67, at 22.
76. See K. GRzYBOwsKi, supra note 74, at 182-215.
77. The General Principles of Criminal Law decreed that a person may be neither con-
victed nor criminally penalized except by a court. Id. at 196. But, as Grzybowski notes, the
administration of justice by community administrative organizations (formally non-criminal)
has, in practice, eroded this barrier. Id.
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campaign, however, undermined the ability of the criminal process to
effectively squelch dissent. Criminal and civil psychiatric internment of-
fered Soviet authorities a bypass around the criminal process to achieve
this result.
After Khrushchev's liberalizations, instead of spcret police tribunals,
summary procedures, and the old idea of criminal liability for any act
that might retrospectively be declared "socially dangerous," the State
had at its disposal only a small set of statutes dealing with specified anti-
Soviet acts. These statutes were quite general and open to expansive judi-
cial interpretation, 78 unrestrained by Western-style due process require-
ments of definitional precision.79 Yet they required the State to attempt
to identify discrete acts allegedly committed and at least arguably cogni-
zable. Once the State did so, the provisions framed issues for debate-
including questions of definition and intent-which simmered with both
latent and explicit political content.80
78. In the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR), where the 1960 Criminal
Code remains in effect with only minor revisions, the harsher of the two provisions most com-
monly invoked against dissenters bars: (1) "[a]gitation or propaganda carried on for the pur-
pose of subverting or weakening the Soviet regime;" (2) "commit[ting] particularly dangerous
crimes against the state;" (3) "dissemination for the said purposes of slanderous inventions
defamatory to the Soviet political and social system;" and (4) "dissemination or production or
harboring for the said purpose of literature of similar content." R.S.F.S.R. CRIM. CODE art.
70 (punishable by 2 to 5 years exile, a 6-month to 7-year prison term, or both), reprinted in
Feldbrugge, Law and Political Dissent in the Soviet Union, in CONTEMPORARY SOVIET LAW,
supra note 67, at 60. The less severe provision prohibits (1) "[s]ystematic dissemination in oral
form of deliberately false inventions, discrediting the Soviet political and social system," and
(2) "production or dissemination in written, printed, or other form of works of similar con-
tent." R.S.F.S.R. CRIM. CODE art. 190-1 (punishable by up to 3 years in prison, up to 1 year
of "corrective labor," or a fine of up to 100 rubles), reprinted in id. at 63. According to one
Western expert in Soviet law, the essential difference between these provisions is the requisite
degree of intent: Article 70 requires a specific anti-Soviet purpose (so-called direct intent),
while article 190-1 requires merely that the accused have acted with knowledge of the anti-
Soviet consequences (indirect intent). Id. at 60-64. Defendants frequently plead a reduction of
the charge from article 70 to article 190-1, and courts occasionally grant this reduction. Id. at
64.
79. See, eg., Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971) (criminal ordinance banning
any sidewalk conduct "annoying to persons passing by" held, inter alia, to violate due process
standard of vagueness).
80. In addition to the provisions in articles 70 and 190-1, see supra note 78, other RSFSR
criminal code provisions are occasionally used against dissidents. These include: article 64
("Betrayal of the Homeland," which includes "joining the enemy," espionage, "revealing a
state or military secret," "escaping to a foreign country," and "assisting a foreign state in
inimical activity against the U.S.S.R."), cited in A. PODRABINEK, PUNITIVE MEDICINE 100
(1980); article 83 ("Illegal Exit Abroad," applied to attempted defectors not deemed to be
politically motivated), cited in id.; article 72 ("Anti-Soviet Organizational Activity," applied
to participation in political organizations not officially sanctioned), cited in id. at 106; article 75
("Disclosure of a State Secret"), cited in id. at 114; article 209 ("Habitual Vagrancy"), cited in
id. at 115. In addition, article 206 (hooliganism) and article 191 (resisting a police officer) are
also invoked. See Feldbrugge, supra note 78, at 65.
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Thus, ironically, the criminal justice process can serve as a forum for
the political dialogue between dissenters and the authorities that the
criminal law is designed to squelch. 81 Denied access to legislative, mass
media, and other public fora, dissenters willing to take the risk and bear
the consequences can challenge the State in the criminal arena, protected
by the "socialist legality" of the post-Stalin procedural code. In criminal
proceedings against an adult defendant held legally responsible for his
actions, the authorities are limited by the restrictions discussed above,
the accused is guaranteed defense counsel once a pretrial investigation is
complete, 82 and-most significantly-the trial must be open.83 This last,
vague requirement has been inconsistently implemented. Trials for rou-
tine crimes without political overtones have generally been "open" to the
public, while some trials of dissidents for political offenses have been
"open" only to one or a few family members.84 But even such limited
"openness" in political trials permits the colloquy between a defiant dis-
senter and the State to leak out via underground verbal and samizdat
channels to foreign media and eventually (via foreign, Russian language
broadcasts) to many Soviet citizens. 85 The result is a tarnished political
image abroad and an unwanted pluralism in the political messages heard
at home. For the Soviet Union's post-Stalinist leaders, Khrushchevian
"socialist legality" has had its political price.
Whether the designers of Soviet legal procedures for the internment of
the mentally ill had in mind a way to silence dissenters without paying
this price is a question for which we have no direct evidence.8 6 But to a
remarkable degree, the system they created provides effective legal tools
for doing so. Soviet procedures for the determination of criminal respon-
sibility and competency to stand trial make it simple to shunt dissenters
along a low resistance path from the criminal forum to psychiatric insti-
tutions. Moreover, the Soviet system of civil commitment grants psychi-
atrists sweeping authority, unchecked by judicial process, to intern
81. See id. at 56-57 (law as vehicle for political argument).
82. See R.S.F.S.R. CRIM. PROC. CODE art. 47. There are few substantial differences be-
tween the Criminal Law and Procedure Codes of Russia and of the other Union Republics.
83. See KONsTrrrrsii art. 157 (U.S.S.R.).
84. The trial of Vladimir Bukovsky is perhaps the most prominent example. See infra note
144.
85. A recent example is the 1981 trial of dissident psychiatrist Anatoly Koryagin, whose
defiant courtroom words were smuggled out via samizdat to the Western press. See Transcript
of Koryagin trial (1981) (unpublished, samizdat document, copy on file with the Yale Journal
of International Law).
86. Those partial to "simple evil" explanations of Soviet psychiatric practices appear to
assume such intent without articulating their reasons. See, ag., Chodoff, Ethical Conflicts in
Psychiatry: The Soviet Union Vs The U.S., 36 Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCH. 925, 926 (1985).
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anyone they believe may in the future commit "socially dangerous" (in-
cluding dissenting) acts.
B. Criminal Commitment
1. The Legal Test
The basic Soviet rule for determining criminal responsibility requires
that a defendant who has committed a "socially dangerous" criminal act
be found "not responsible, ' 87 if when committing the act he could not
"realize the significance of his actions or control them because of a
chronic mental illness, temporary mental derangement, mental defi-
ciency, or other condition of illness."' 88 This formulation is notably simi-
lar to the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code rule, which has
been widely adopted by the United States circuit courts of appeals. 89 Ac-
cording to the A.L.I. rule, "[a] person is not responsible for criminal
conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or
defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality of
his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law." 90
For non-responsibility, both the Soviet and A.L.I. rules require that
mental illness has caused either a loss of ability to comprehend a criminal
deed's "significance" ("criminality") or a loss of "control" ("capacity" to
"conform" to law) over one's behavior.
This formulation, as Judge Bazelon has observed, is vulnerable to ap-
plication in ways that abdicate to medical experts the moral questions at
the core of the criminal responsibility issue.91 Bazelon points to two
problems. First, the requirement of mental disease permits psychiatrists,
armed with their own value-laden conceptions of what patterns of
thought and behavior constitute mental illness, to impose their moral
choices on the legal system by the act of diagnosis.92 Second, the unde-
fined causation requirement invites psychiatrists to testify in a conclusory
manner as to whether a defendant's impairment resulted in his criminal
behavior. In so doing, psychiatrists veil, behind their jargon, particular
conceptions of legally cognizable causation. Such conceptions reflect
political premises-notions about whether particular theories of "but
for" causation ought to justify exculpation. For every human act has its
87. The Russian term nevmeniaemyi is also variously translated as "non-imputable" and
"insane." Feldbrugge, supra note 78, at 67.
88. R.S.F.S.R. CRIM. CODE art. 11.
89. United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 973 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
90. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
91. Brawner, 471 F.2d at 1017-30 (Bazelon, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(criticizing A.L.I. rule).
92. For a tartly perceptive commentary on the attraction and power of diagnosis as a
political and moral tool in American political life as well as in American and Soviet court-




complex web of "but for" causes, and the legal issue of criminal responsi-
bility is at heart a question of which causes should count.93
The law of criminal responsibility in the Soviet Union thus allows wide
deference to whatever value-laden notions of normality and deviance are
embodied in prevailing psychiatric doctrine. As the A.L.I. rule demon-
strates, though, the Soviets are hardly unique in this regard. Were polit-
ical dissent a crime under American law and a sign of illness according to
American psychiatric theory, the inevitable implication of the A.L.I. rule
would be the criminal insanity of dissenters. The Soviet test of criminal
responsibility, in short, invites the conceptualization of dissent as disease,
but this is not due to any basic difference from Western rules for deter-
mining responsibility.
Curiously, the Soviet test of competency to stand trial is almost identi-
cal to the criminal responsibility rule-a defendant may not be tried (or
sentenced) if "mental illness. . deprives him of the possibility of realiz-
ing the significance of his actions or of controlling them." 94 Thus, on
competency as well as on criminal responsibility, Soviet substantive law
defers to the aura of psychiatric expertise, again easing the way for dispo-
sal of dissenters as diseased.
93. Judge Bazelon draws an analogy between the concept of illness in the law of criminal
responsibility and the tort concepts of duty and proximate cause. His analogy applies equally
to the causation requirement of the A.L.I. and Soviet rules. All are artificial concepts-instru-
ments for effecting policy judgments about where legal responsibility should lie. See United
States v. Eichberg, 439 F.2d 620, 625 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (Bazelon, C.J., concurring). In tort law,
contrasting moral visions of fairness, economic principles of loss-spreading and efficient cost-
avoidance, and other policy considerations vie for implementation in the form of rules about
duty and proximate cause. Similarly, in criminal law, conflicting moral ideals of human re-
sponsibility vie with retributive, rehabilitative, and deterrent goals for effectuation as principles
of legally cognizable culpability.
94. R.S.F.S.R. CRIM. CODE art. 11. In contrast, American tests of competency focus on
the accused's ability to understand the charge and participate in his defense. Such a focus is
more directly germane to the task of criminal defense and less subject to conclusory psychia-
tric testimony that may reflect doctors' prejudices-irrelevant to the narrow question of com-
petency-about whether the accused should be hospitalized. Surely, if the issue is the
accused's capacity to participate in his own defense, it is irrelevant whether the accused is
mentally ill or whether mental illness is the cause of the accused's impairments. The only
component of the Soviet rule conceivably relevant is the issue of whether the defendant can
"realize the significance of his actions." An explanation for this apparent confusion may lie in
the precept that the central function of Soviet criminal law is the teaching of principles of
socialist morality. See generally Berman, The Educational Role of Soviet Criminal Law and
Civil Procedure, in CONTEMPORARY SOVIET LAW, supra note 67, at 1-16. If pre-trial factual
investigation is thought to have determined whether the accused has physically committed the
proscribed act, then the question of competence to stand trial becomes a question of the value
of the trial as an educational proceeding. If, because of mental illness, an individual can
neither control his actions nor realize their significance, the trial has no educative potential,
and socialist morality is better inculcated by mental health professionals.
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2. The Criminal Process and Psychiatric Examination
The Soviet system of criminal procedure contributes further to the ten-
dency to treat dissent as disease. After a defendant has been arrested and
charged, investigators from the Procuracy 95 begin a pre-trial inquiry.
Either they or the court may order a psychiatric examination at any time
before or during trial.96 Psychiatrists are selected and appointed by the
investigator or the court,97 to whom they must report their conclusions.
Procedures are identical for questions of criminal responsibility and com-
petency to stand trial. Examinations are generally conducted by com-
missions of three psychiatrists (fewer in remote regions) under detailed
guidelines issued by Moscow's Serbsky Institute of Forensic Psychia-
try.98 The accused, his family or guardian, and his defense counsel may
ask the court for a psychiatric consultation. The court, however, may
refuse9 9 and usually does. In accord with Soviet rejection of the adver-
sarial system,lc° psychiatric examiners appointed by investigators and
courts are officially viewed as impartial and objective;101 thus defense
consultation with experts is deemed unnecessary. Soviet authorities as-
sert that because all examiners, including the Serbsky Institute's psychi-
atric doyens, are employed by agencies under the aegis of the U.S.S.R.
and Union Republic Ministries of Health, they are independent of inves-
tigators' pressures. 102 But Soviet law permits investigators to be present
during psychiatric examinations,10 3 and several dissidents have reported
95. The Procuracy (Prokuratura) is a State organ with a broad constitutional mandate to
monitor and enforce governmental officials' and individuals' compliance with law. In criminal
proceedings, the agency's attorneys serve as investigators, prosecutors, and supervisors of the
legality of judicial proceedings and decisions. 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOVIET LAW 545-48 (F.
Feldbrugge ed. 1973). This combination of roles reflects Soviet rejection of principles of sepa-
ration of powers and adversarial jurisprudence as bourgeois notions, unnecessary in a society
without class interests.
96. R.S.F.S.R. CRIM. PROC. CODE art. 79. Investigators need not obtain court approval
to issue such an order. Moreover, if psychiatric examiners evaluate a defendant in prison or as
an outpatient and then conclude that there is a "necessity for constant observation" to com-
plete the evaluation, an investigator has the authority to commit the accused to a hospital
without judicial approval. R.S.F.S.R. CRIM. PROC. CODE art. 188.
97. Forensic Psychiatric Examination in the USSR, Instruction approved Oct. 27, 1970,
reprinted in A. PODRABINEK, supra note 80, at 203-08 [hereinafter cited as Instruction on
Forensic Psychiatric Examination]. Psychiatrists so appointed are legally required to serve,
on pain of criminal sanction. R.S.F.S.R. CRIM. CODE art. 182.
98. Instruction on Forensic Psychiatric Examination, supra note 97.
99. S. BLOCH & P. REDDAWAY, supra note 5, at 99.
100. See supra note 95.
101. A. PODRABINEK, supra note 80, at 123.
102. Id. See also Instruction on Forensic Psychiatric Examination, supra note 97, at 203-
04.




that psychiatrists at the Serbsky Institute have military ranks in the Min-
istry of Internal Affairs (MVD), a security organ that takes orders from
the Procuracy and the KGB.104
Soviet criminal procedure renders a defendant legally impotent to
challenge psychiatric disposition of his case. When a pre-trial investiga-
tor orders a psychiatric evaluation, she need not inform the accused.
Nor must the forensic commission reveal its conclusions and recommen-
dations to the defendant if the commission concludes that "his mental
state makes this [disclosure] impossible."10 5 Moreover, the accused loses
the right to be told the results of the criminal investigation, shown mater-
ials compiled by the investigators, and informed if new charges are
brought against him.10 6 While undergoing in-patient examination, he is
generally denied visits from family members and access to a lawyer.107
Nor is the accused's lawyer "permitted to participate in a case [until af-
ter] the fact of the mental illness of the [criminal] is established."108
After the psychiatric examiners' conclusions have been submitted, the
court holds a summary hearing, in lieu of a full-scale trial, to decide sev-
eral issues: (1) whether the defendant has committed a socially danger-
ous crime; (2) whether to accept the examiners' findings on the question
of criminal responsibility (or competency to stand trial); and (3) what
measures to apply.109 The accused has no right to attend this hearing. 10
Access is left to the court's discretion, but in political cases' the defend-
ant is rarely allowed to be present.1 12 In such cases, moreover, courts
almost always approve the psychiatric commission's findings on responsi-
bility1 13 (or competency) and recommendations as to the disposition of
the accused. 14 Theoretically, Soviet law gives psychiatric examiners and
104. See, e.g., V. NEKIPELOV, INSTITUTE OF FooLs: NOTES FROM THE SERBSKY 26-27
(1980).
105. R.S.F.S.R. CRIM. PROC. CODE art. 184.
106. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 1, at 6.
107. Id.
108. R.S.F.S.R. CRIM. PROC. CODE art. 405.
109. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 1, at 6.
110. Id.
111. See, ag., R.S.F.S.R. CRIM. CODE arts. 70 and 190-1 (cases arising under these arti-
cles). See also supra note 78.
112. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 1, at 6.
113. Feldbrugge, supra note 78, at 67.
114. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 1, at 6. In rare instances an investigator or a
court will question a commission's conclusions and request a second examination. S. BLOCH &
P. REDDAWAY, supra note 5, at 100. The Serbsky Institute is responsible for organizing all
such reexaminations. Instruction on Forensic Psychiatric Examination, supra note 97, at 203-
07. In some especially sensitive political cases, Serbsky staff members themselves conduct the
examination; when the results of two examinations conflict, a court almost always adopts the
Serbsky's opinion. S. BLOCH & P. REDDAWAY, supra note 5, at 100. See, eg., IAPUP, IN-
FORMATION BULL. No. 3, Mar. 1982, at 11 (case of Vasily Spinenko, a philosophy student
who proposed a philosophic alternative to Marxism and capitalism, was arrested and twice
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courts three options for disposition of defendants found non-responsible
or incompetent: they may be (1) discharged into the custody of a guard-
ian; (2) interned in a so-called Ordinary Psychiatric Hospital (OPH) if
found "dangerous"; or (3) committed to a Special Psychiatric Hospital
(SPH) if found "especially dangerous." 115 No political defendant found
non-responsible or incompetent is known to have been discharged, and
confinement to SPH's (operated by the MVD) has been common. 1 6
3. The Role of Value Preferences
In numerous ways, this complex process of psychiatric evaluation and
disposal invites investigators, courts, and doctors to effect their moral
preferences about responsibility, normality, and deviance by enveloping
them in a "scientific" aura of medical authority. This is hardly a
uniquely Soviet phenomenon; critics of psychiatry's role in the American
criminal process repeatedly make this point.1 7 The parallels between
the problem in the Soviet Union and Western nations are curiously over-
looked by the "simple evil" theorists. But peculiar features of the Soviet
process, linked largely to the Marxist-Leninist rejection of the adversarial
system and of a truly independent judiciary, greatly magnify the phe-
nomenon in the U.S.S.R. In a context of deep-seated acceptance of au-
thority and rejection of political pluralism, 18 it is hardly surprising that
this situation, coupled with a psychiatric conceptualization of resistance
to authority as a symptom,'1 9 could pave a legal path towards psychiatric
internment of dissenters.
A defendant first experiences this troubling feature of the Soviet pro-
cess when an investigator orders a psychiatric exam. Soviet law articu-
lates no clear standard for an investigator to apply in determining
whether to order an exam. The investigator is thus left to rely upon his
own personal notions of normality and deviance, including beliefs about
the peculiarity of any challenge to respected authority. 120 The American
procedure of judicially-ordered commitment for examination is similarly
found responsible by psychiatric commissions, then examined by the Serbsky, which diagnosed
"sluggish schizophrenia" and found him non-responsible).
115. See R.S.F.S.R. CRIM. CODE arts. 58-60.
116. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 1, at 6. The SPH's are high-security facilities
for the criminally insane. In contrast, the OPH's (run by the Ministry of Health) are popu-
lated largely by civilly committed and voluntary patients.
117. See, e.g., Washington v. United States, 390 F.2d 444 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (Bazelon, C.J.)
(sharply criticizing psychiatrists' courtroom use of diagnostic labels that hide value choices).
118. See infra notes 305-09 and accompanying text.
119. See infra text accompanying notes 247-95.




vulnerable to some degree to personal hunches about who is "sick." 121
But there are critical procedural differences: while a Soviet investigator
has unreviewable authority to order a commitment for examination, an
American jurist does so with the knowledge that a person committed
involuntarily can demand judicial review of the legality of her confine-
ment and that adversarial dialogue might spotlight for scrutiny a. deci-
sionmaker's personal bias. 122 There is no reason to think that Soviet
commitments for examination are any more prone to crude biases about
a behavior's peculiarity than are American commitments. But without
adversarial proceedings and judicial review, these biases are much less
open to careful evaluation and thus more snugly cloaked in the scientific
mantle of diagnosis.
Once a Soviet defendant is in the hands of his psychiatric evaluators, a
different set of circumstances operates to envelop political choices about
his disposition in the aura of medical authority. First, forensic examiners
are officially required not only to investigate and report on the accused's
mental processes, but also to reach conclusions on the issue of legal re-
sponsibility.1 23 Moreover, since psychiatric opinions are subjected to
only minimal cross-examination, there is no opportunity for the judicial
process to separate doctors' moral and legal notions from their technical
reasoning about psychopathology. Instead, these notions are uncritically
accepted by the courts, which routinely adopt experts' conclusions after
only cursory scrutiny. 124 The liberal precept of separation between issues
121. The American procedure's vulnerability to personal hunches is illustrated by one
New York state case in which a landlord with numerous prior convictions for unlawful condi-
tions in his building attempted to plead guilty to a similar offense. People v. Warden of City
Prison, 37 Misc. 2d 660, 235 N.Y.S.2d 531 (Sup. Ct. 1962). An irritated magistrate endured
the defense attorney's plea for mercy, but then snapped:
I don't think I have ever had a defendant before me who was as cruel as you are, abso-
lutely callous to the feelings of other people, little children, sick children. . . . You pay
no attention to the authorities, no attention to the courts, no attention to these inspec-
tors. . . . I don't think that you could possibly be normal-so therefore you are commit-
ted to Bellevue for examination.
Id. at 662, 235 N.Y.S.2d at 536. This commitment not only reflected the magistrate's crude
equating of moral ugliness with mental illness; it expressed his anger at a person apparently
unresponsive to the moral force of the criminal process.
122. Thus, in Warden of City Prison, the defendant's subsequent writ of habeas corpus
forced a fresh adversarial dialogue over the commitment's propriety. On appeal, it was held
that the magistrate's treatment of the landlord's callousness as a disease per se was contrary to
the law's precept of individual responsibility. Id. at 675, 235 N.Y.S.2d at 549.
123. Instruction on Forensic Psychiatric Examination, supra note 97, at 203; see also
Kalashnik, The Legal Position and Organizational Forms of Forensic Psychiatric Expert Exami-
nation, in FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY 24 (G. Morozov & I. Kalashnik eds. 1970) (English transla-
tion of official Soviet forensic psychiatry textbook).
124. See supra text accompanying notes 113-14.
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of fact and value is foreign to Soviet jurisprudence, 1 25 which in techni-
cally complex matters defers to forensic experts on questions of both fact
and law.
This Western ideal of separation, it is true, is conceptually problematic
and arguably unrealizable.1 26 When the United States court of appeals
declared that an accused should be found not criminally responsible if his
unlawful act "was the product of mental disease or mental defect, 1 27 it
reached out daringly toward the separatist ideal. The court hoped that
psychiatrists would testify only as to "the development, adaptation, and
functioning of. . . [emotional] processes and [behavioral] controls. ' 128
The jury was then to decide, as a moral question, whether any purported
impairments in these processes and controls constituted "mental disease
or defect for the... purpose [of] determining criminal responsibility." 129
In other words, the core value issue-whether psychiatric explanation
justified legal exculpation-was to be left to the jurors. But this judicial
experiment ended in disillusionment. Psychiatrists' diagnostic labels, the
court finally concluded, concealed doctors' judgments about defendants'
blameworthiness.1 30 "We assumed," Judge Bazelon wrote for the court,
"that the expert could separate the medical judgments which he was sup-
posed to make from" the legal and moral judgments which he was not
supposed to make. It has become abundantly apparent that this theory
has not worked out. 1 31
The principle of separation, however, must retain some force if an ex-
pert's technical prowess is not always to imply a right to unchecked
moral authority. Without "practical distinctions between the technical
and the political," one critic of separation has acknowledged, there is
nothing to prevent experts "from using their discretion gradually to draw
political decisions under the cloak of expertise .... ,,132 Even after
Judge Bazelon's confession of disillusion, the D.C. Circuit continued to
125. For the Marxist-Leninist, there are no "value questions" in the liberal, Weberian
sense, because the "Marxist-Leninist science of society" and its laws of social development
provide correct answers to all questions of social, political, and legal choice. See S. BLOCH &
P. REDDAWAY, supra note 5, at 44 (quoting Stalin on scientists' obligation to learn and apply
this "science of society").
126. See, eg., Yellin, Science, Technology, and Administrative Government: Institutional
Designs for Environmental Decisionmaking, 92 YALE L.J. 1300 (1983) (arguing that science
policy issues involving tenuous evidence and uncertain predictions cannot be neatly separated
into technical and legal component questions).
127. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 826, 875 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
128. McDonald v. United States, 312 F.2d 847, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (en banc).
129. Id.
130. Washington v. United States, 390 F.2d 444, 453 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
131. Id. at 452.





grope for such "practical distinctions," resisting a total surrender to psy-
chiatrists' moral judgments. 133 Persistent judicial discussion of the need
for distinctions may sensitize American psychiatrists to the limits of their
forensic role. Moreover, effective cross-examination can probe beneath
conclusory diagnostic labels to discern hidden moral premises. By con-
trast, the Soviets' total rejection of the principle of separation constitutes
carte blanche for Soviet legal institutions to cover questions of criminal
responsibility "under the cloak of expertise."
4. The Role of the Forensic Psychiatrist
The individual Soviet psychiatrist, however, may have little latitude to
exercise personal bias independently when performing forensic duties. In
preparing a forensic evaluation, the clinician faces at least three potential
sources of political guidance-the Serbsky Institute's "methodological
and scientific management" of all examinations,13 4 ex parte "inquiries"
by the Party, 135 and the Procuracy investigator. 136 The "simple evil"
theorists have interpreted this political guidance as convincing proof that
Soviet forensic examiners are cynically obedient participants in a con-
scious conspiracy to abuse their medical patina for repressive ends. 137
That conclusion, however, is hardly obvious. Little information has
reached the West on the precise nature of the guidance or pressure that
comes from these bureaucratic avenues.1 38
133. In Washington, the court opted to preserve the "product of mental disease or mental
defect" test but decreed that "psychiatrists should not speak directly in terms of 'product' or
even 'result' or 'cause'." 390 F.2d at 455-56. Rather, they "should explain how defendant's
disease or defect relates to his alleged offense, that is, how the development, adaptation and
functioning of defendant's behavioral processes may have influenced his conduct." Id at 456.
The court issued a detailed "Instruction" for psychiatrists, urging avoidance of moral judg-
ments and warning: "[You may not state conclusions or opinions as an expert unless you also
tell the jury what investigations, observations, reasoning, and medical theory led to your opin-
ion." Id. at 457. Eventually, though, the court in United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969
(D.C. Cir. 1972) gave up on such painstaking attempts to fine-tune the Durham "product"
test, and instead replaced it with the A.L.I. rule. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
The Durham "product" requirement, the court reasoned, invited expert testimony that en-
croached on the jury's function. Durham, 471 F.2d at 983. The A.L.I. test's reduced emphasis
on causation, the majority believed, would free jurors from "undue dominance" by experts.
Id. at 981. But see supra text accompanying notes 91-93 (argument that A.L.I. rule does
permit expert usurpation of value choices).
134. Instruction on Forensic Psychiatric Examination, supra note 97.
135. There is much evidence of systematic Party intervention in individual criminal cases.
Ex parte contacts are officially justified on the ground that there is a distinction between legiti-
mate "inquiry" and improper "pressure;" it is necessary for Party organs "to demand of State
organs the grounds for the correctness of their actions ..... Juviler, supra note 66, at 68
(quoting an official Party publication).
136. The investigator has the right to be present during the examination. See supra note
103 and accompanying text.
137. S. BLOCH & P. REDDAWAY, supra note 5, at 263-72.
138. Virtually all Western information about Soviet psychiatric practices has come from
official statements, carefully molded in accordance with Leninist concepts of publicity, and
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What is known, though, is that the theories of the "Moscow School"
of psychiatry, centered at the Serbsky and several other nationally pres-
tigious institutions, are taught uncritically to medical students and
psychiatrists-in-training throughout the Soviet Union. Like nascent pro-
fessionals anywhere, young Soviet physicians absorb and integrate the
values, beliefs, and theoretical constructs of their teachers and role mod-
els. 139 They do so, moreover, in a climate of common awareness that the
moral and political qualities esteemed by the Party are vital to career
advancement. 14 ' An estimated twenty-five percent of the Soviet medical
curriculum is devoted to Marxist-Leninist theory. 141 In acute contrast to
the Hippocratic Oath's individualistic focus, the oath sworn to by young
Soviet physicians stresses each one's obligation to be "guided by the prin-
ciples of communist morality, ever to bear in mind. . . my responsibility
to the people and the Soviet state." 142
Much evidence suggests that cynicism about communist ideals is now
endemic in the Soviet Union, even among Party members and elite pro-
fessionals.143 Yet this is hardly a sufficient basis to presume that Soviet
psychiatrists do not at all genuinely believe in, and respond to, the moral
and patriarchal legitima6y of the Party and the State. More plausibly,
the average forensic examiner is guided by a sort of "triplethink"'44-a
complex mindset of duty, conformity, and hypocrisy-reflecting incul-
cated values, pragmatic caution, and swallowed doubt. If so, then the
mandatory guidance of the Serbsky, the Party's ex parte "inquiries," and
the investigator's right to attend examinations may be primary reminders
of sensed obligation, not means of commanding medically garbed
marionettes. 145
from dissident sources who can usually only speculate or draw indirect inferences about rela-
tionships between psychiatrists and Soviet officialdom.
139. Cf. Reich, Diagnosing Soviet Dissidents, HARPER'S, Aug. 1978, at 35 (psychiatrists'
training strengthens biases); C. BOSK, FORGIVE AND REMEMBER (1979) (surgeons-in-training
in American hospitals win professional acceptance and career opportunities not, primarily,
through displays of technical virtuosity or intellectual excellence, but by coolly conforming to
and integrating the personal and professional styles of their elders).
140. S. BLOCH & P. REDDAWAY, supra note 5, at 44.
141. Id. (quoting an emigr6 Soviet psychiatrist).
142. Id. at 43 (quoting translation of Soviet oath) (emphasis in original).
143. See generally K. SIMIS, USSR: THE CORRUPT SOCIETY (1982) (emigr6 Soviet law-
yer's report on widespread cynicism and official corruption).
144. The term is Vladimir Bukovsky's. See Thorne, Mother Courage: How Vladimir
Bukovsky Was Saved, N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1977, § 6 (Magazine), at 52.
145. Dissenters Vladimir Bukovsky and Dr. Semyon Gluzman, a psychiatrist, suggest sar-
donically that Soviet psychiatrists fall into six categories: (1) the enthusiastic "novice," who
sincerely believes in the values and concepts of his elders and applies them uncritically (but is
not generally named to forensic commissions); (2) the "academic," who has retained his
"youthful" commitment to these values and concepts but regards forensic work as beneath his




5. Effects of a Finding of Criminal Non-Responsibility
Whatever the motivations of forensic examiners, their reports are
laden with conclusory diagnostic phrases 146 that effectively obscure polit-
ical choices about the disposition of political offenders. When a dissenter
is found non-responsible, the result is not only the discrediting of his
challenge to authority, but an end run around the requisites of post-Sta-
lin "socialist legality." With only a summary court hearing, instead of
the more complete trial guaranteed by Soviet law, a verdict of non-re-
sponsibility can be imposed upon a defendant. 147 Once interned, a per-
son cannot challenge his continued detention. Rather, the law deems the
individual to be mentally incompetent and thus without standing to
make an appeal to the courts.148 Interested persons, including relatives,
may petition a court for the release of a criminally committed patient,149
but such requests are rarely honored. In practice, patients are generally
released only after reexamination by an official psychiatric commission, a
procedure that the law mandates at least once every six months.150 If a
commission finds for continued detention, release is out of the question.
But if the examiners recommend release or transfer from an SPH to an
OPH, their findings are reviewed by a court, which must grant approval
before a patient can be discharged or moved.151 Little is known in the
boundaries of the disease that is his specialty 'and eyes criminal defendants as clinical "mate-
rial;" (4) the "Voltarian," who, "disillusioned with psychiatry, would prefer to talk about art
and literature, but being a coward and a cynic, will 'convincingly' find the patient mentally
sound 'so nobody can pin a thing on him';" (5) the "Philistine"-the average, well-adapted
clinician-a "contemporary rentier" who sincerely regards non-conformity as abnormal,
"yields easily to pressure from above, and always justifies himself (in his own eyes) by citing
authorities and psychiatric 'schools';" and (6) the "professional hangman"-the only one of
the six who "deliberately" looks to find political defendants non-responsible. Bukovsky &
Gluzman, A Manual on Psychiatry for Dissenters (samizdat monograph smuggled out of a
labor camp), reprinted in S. BLOCH & P. REDDAWAY, supra note 5, at 419, 429-30.
146. See, e.g., S. BLOCH & P. REDDAWAY, supra note 5, at 115, 139-40 (Serbsky Institute
Commissions that examined dissident General Pyotr Grigorenko and poet Natalya Gorbanev-
skaya found mental illness and criminal non-responsibility, necessitating compulsory hospitali-
zation, but failed to state reasons).
147. In the U.S., by contrast, in every state a defendant is presumed to be sane at the
outset of the trial and must introduce sufficient evidence to put sanity at issue. Hagan, The
Insanity Defense: A Review of Recent Statutory Changes, 3 J. LEGAL MED. 617, 623 (1983).
148. See S. BLOCH & P. REDDAWAY, supra note 5, at 101.
149. R.S.F.S.R. CRIM. PROC. CODE art. 412.
150. S. BLOCH & P. REDDAWAY, supra note 5, at 101. All reports are submitted to the
court.
151. Id. Courts usually, but not always, approve reexaminers' release or transfer recom-
mendations. In the case of Spinenko, see supra note 114, psychiatrists recommended in 1981
that he be released, but a town court ruled otherwise. Spinenko's relatives asked the Donetsk
regional procurator to intervene, and in a highly unusual move, the procurator appealed the
decision. The higher court ruled against the procurator, though, and Spinenko remained in
the hospital. IAPUP, INFORMATION BULL. No. 3, Mar. 1982, at 11. Also in 1981, a touring
psychiatric commission from the Serbsky Institute recommended that Anatoly Lupynos, an
Amnesty International prisoner of conscience, be transferred from an SPH to an OPH. The
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West about what prompts reexaminers and courts to grant or to deny
release. But for political dissenters and would-be emigres, recantation
appears to be important, albeit not essential.
According to knowledgeable observers, Soviet psychiatric internments
usually do not exceed maximum prison terms. 152 But there are frequent
exceptions to this observed pattern 53 that has no legal status as an offi-
cial rule. Thus, for the internee, the bottom line is indefinite confine-
ment. Moreover, Soviet internees are commonly released with severe
legal encumbrances of indefinite duration. These include an obligation to
attend and to obey orders from a psychiatric clinic and to have a legal
disability status and a "social dangerousness" rating which, for dissi-
dents, may result in prophylactic internments during high-profile public
events. 154
The dilemma of indeterminate commitment for defendants found
either incompetent to stand trial or not criminally responsible is not
unique to the Soviet system. In the United States, too, defendants in
some jurisdictions may be found incompetent or not responsible, then
committed to mental institutions for periods far longer than the maxi-
mum sentence for a guilty verdict.1 55 But statutes and case law in nu-
merous U.S. jurisdictions limit criminal commitments for incompetency
and for non-responsibility to the length of the maximum sentence for the
offense charged or to some fraction thereof.156 Furthermore, upon re-
lease, American internees generally may not be encumbered with any-
thing like the outpatient legal restrictions of their Soviet counterparts.15 7
transfer did not take place, leading Western observers to infer that a court ruled against it.
See id. at 9.
152. See IAPUP, INFORMATION BULL. No. 5, Ocr. 1982, at 14-15.
153. See, eg., the case of Vladimir Rozhdestvov, who was charged in 1977 with violating
R.S.F.S.R. CRIM. CODE art. 190-1 (denigrating the Soviet State carries maximum term of
three years, see supra note 78), was found non-responsible and committed to an SPH, where he
remained six years later still refusing to recant. S. BLOCH & P. REDDAWAY, supra note 2, at
98.
154. See S. BLOCH & P. REDDAWAY, supra note 5, at 101-02. Such events have included
major holidays, visits by foreign leaders, and the 1980 Olympic Games.
155. The classic rationale is one of therapeutic compassion laced with insensitivity to the
possibility that human dignity may lie, for the internee, in resisting the therapists' efforts to
remold him in accordance with their ideals. See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354
(1983) (length of hospitalization should depend solely on need for treatment; due process
clause does not require that criminal commitment of persons acquitted by reason of insanity be
limited to length of maximum sentence).
156. In Connecticut, for example, a defendant found incompetent to stand trial may be
confined for treatment for no longer than 18 months or the maximum sentence he could re-
ceive, whichever is shorter. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-56d(i) (1985). Connecticut defendants
acquitted by reason of insanity may be criminally committed for no longer than 25 years or the
maximum sentence for the offense charged, whichever is shorter. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-
47(b) (1985).
157. In a few states, however, patients acquitted by reason of insanity may be legally re-




Finally, all American internees have access to the courts and are at least
theoretically protected by the right of habeas corpus.
In short, the Soviet system of criminal commitment has some charac-
teristics strikingly similar to its counterparts in various American juris-
dictions. But coupled with (1) a substantive criminal law that
encompasses dissent, and (2) a medical conception of opposition to au-
thority as a sign of illness,158 the Soviet system leads inevitably to psychi-
atric internment of political dissidents. This tendency is augmented by
features of Soviet criminal procedure that are different from their Ameri-
can counterparts-features that reflect the rejection of the adversarial
process and the separation of questions of fact from issues of value, as
well as a diminished regard for the dignity of individuals' consciously
voluntary choices.
C. Civil Commitment
The post-Stalin reform campaign of the 1950's, which brought such
dramatic change to Soviet criminal law, failed to achieve one of the re-
formers' most cherished goals-the comprehensive codification of Soviet
administrative law and procedure.1 59 The significance of this failure is
vast. In a country where virtually all business, social service, scientific,
and cultural affairs are conducted within state institutions, state adminis-
trative action is the transcendently important form of social regula-
tion.' 60 The protection of citizens' rights and interests depends largely
on the procedural principles that govern administrative promulgation of
general rules and handling of individual cases. Yet despite a
Khrushchev-era campaign for the development and passage of a compre-
hensive, nationwide administrative procedure act, no all-Union or
RSFSR procedural statutes exist to govern the activities of the myriad of
state organs.161
158. See infra text accompanying notes 247-95.
159. See Barry, The Development of Soviet Administrative Procedure, in SOviET LAW AF-
TER STALIN, supra note 66, at 1, 2.
160. Under the Soviet Constitution, only the Supreme Soviet and its Presidium (the "or-
gans of State power") have the authority to enact statutes. The Council of Ministers, individ-
ual ministries, and state committees (the "organs of state administration") are empowered to
issue general rules, or "normative acts," "on the basis of and in fulfillment of" statutes. In
practice, "normative acts" are much more numerous than statutes and probably much more
significant; indeed a prominent Soviet legal scholar has complained that substatutory enact-
ments are "eclipsing" statutory law because of statutes' vagueness and the wide range of issues
consequently covered by administrative rules. See id. at 4-6. This complaint has a familiar
ring to American lawyers. In the Soviet Union, however, there are no provisions for judicial
review, either of administrative rulemaking or administrative application of rules to individual
cases.
161. In 1958, the U.S.S.R.'s leading scholar of administrative procedure published an arti-
cle urging a separate codification of administrative procedure. But despite vibrant scholarly
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The Soviet approach to civil commitment of the mentally ill should be
considered in this disturbing light. In the U.S.S.R., civil commitment is
an administrative action, vulnerable to all the arbitrariness possible with-
out a law of administrative procedure. A 1971 directive issued by the
Ministry of Public Health (in coordination with the Procurator and the
Ministry of Internal Affairs) sets forth criteria and administrative re-
quirements for civil commitment. 162 Like most other administratively
enacted rules, this document is not readily accessible to the Soviet pub-
lic. 163 It was issued in numbered copies "for official use only" and was
not leaked to the West until the late 1970's.I Moreover, like other So-
viet administrative directives, it is not subject to judicial review for com-
pliance with either constitutional or statutory requirements. 65 Nor does
Soviet law require court approval or provide for any kind of appellate
judicial review for individual commitment decisions made pursuant to
the directive.' 66
The status of civil commitment as an administrative function, insu-
lated from the requisites of the judicial process, is an anomaly under So-
viet law. Legal competence to inherit, bequeath, donate, or sell property
is, under codified statutes of civil law and procedure, a question for the
courts.' 67 A prominent Soviet legal scholar, N. S. Malein, argues that
discussion of numerous codification proposals and general agreement among Soviet lawyers on
the importance of procedure, no legislative action has been taken. Id. at 2.
162. Urgent Hospitalization of the Socially Dangerous Mentally Ill: Instruction of the
Ministry of Public Health of the USSR, Aug. 26, 1971, reprinted in A. PODRABINEK, supra
note 80, at 195 [hereinafter cited as Instruction on Hospitalization].
163. Only statutes (issued by the Supreme Soviet and its Presidium) and rules promulgated
by the Council of Ministers must be published. Barry, supra note 159, at 7.
164. By 1977, parts of the 1971 directive had reached the West via the samizdat journal
Chronicle of Current Events. S. BLOCH & P. REDDAWAY, supra note 5, at 155-56. Only later
did the dissident Working Commission to Investigate the Use of Psychiatry for Political Pur-
poses apparently obtain a complete copy. The directive appears to have been published in the
West for the first time in 1979 with the Russian language edition of Commission member
Alexander Podrabinek's book, PUNITIVE MEDICINE, supra note 80.
165. In contrast, the U.S. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551 (1982), guaran-
tees the availability of judicial review for all exercises of administrative discretion unless there
is clear evidence of specific congressional intent to restrict access to review. Review focuses on
three general issues: (1) whether the agency acted within the scope of statutory and constitu-
tional authority; (2) whether the agency weighed all the "relevant factors" and made no "clear
error of judgment;" and (3) whether the agency followed "necessary procedural require-
ments." Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415-17 (1971).
166. In a few American jurisdictions, statutes provide for civil commitment via adminis-
trative hearing. Such hearings must conform to constitutional requirements of due process;
internees have a right to judicial review. See Developments in the Law-Civil Commitment of
the Mentally Ill, 87 HARV. L. REv. 1190, 1269-70 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Civil Commit-
ment]. Moreover, the due process clause has been construed to require a "clear and convinc-
ing evidence" test for involuntary commitment. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
167. R.S.F.S.R. CIV. CODE art. 15. See also Kholodkovskaia, Forensic Psychiatric Expert
Examination in Civil Proceedings: Problems of Incompetence of the Mentally Ill, in FORENSIC
PSYCHIATRY, supra note 123, at 86.
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under the Soviet Constitution, civil commitment of the mentally ill ought
to be subject to judicial review.168 He cites a constitutional provision
that guarantees "inviolability of the person" and bars arrest unless ap-
proved by a court or a procurator. 169 Noting that judicial proceedings
are necessary to declare a person legally incompetent, he argues that, a
fortiori, they ought to be required in all cases of involuntary psychiatric
commitment "since this involves a limitation 'not just of civil law compe-
tence but also on individual freedom'." 170 This, Malein observes, would
bring procedures for involuntary civil commitment into line with
statutory provisions that require judicial approval for criminal
commitment.171
Malein's constitutional reasoning is flawed. Statutory requirements
that a court approve criminal commitments and findings of legal incom-
petence suggest that treating civil commitment as a purely administrative
matter is inconsistent policy, but they are a weak basis for constitutional
interpretation. Nonetheless, Malein's argument points to the large gap in
"socialist legality" left by the failure of the post-Stalinist reformers to
enact a system of administrative procedure and judicial review of admin-
istrative action. Within this gap, the Soviet machinery of civil commit-
ment is legally free to detain citizens with a potentially Stalinist
arbitrariness.1 72
1. Criteria for Civil Commitment
Despite the lack of constitutional or statutory guidelines, the agencies
that operate the machinery of civil commitment-the U.S.S.R. and
Union Republic Ministries of Public Health, in conjunction with the
Procuracy, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the KGB-have gener-
ally not acted with Stalinist arbitrariness. The 1971 directive sets forth
168. Barry, supra note 159, at 18 (citing Malein's article in a Soviet journal).
169. KONSTITUSI. art. 54 (U.S.S.R.) ("No one may be subjected to arrest other thai on
the basis of a judicial decision or with the sanction of a procurator.").
170. Barry, supra note 159, at 18 (quoting Malein).
171. Id.
172. Soviet officials involved in administrative civil commitment have justified the absence
of judicial review primarily by contending that Ministry of Public Health oversight is suffi-
cient to ensure that commitment criteria and procedures are properly applied. PUBLIC
HEALTH SERVICE, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MENTAL HEALTH, PUB. No. 1893, SPECIAL
REPORT: THE FIRST U.S. MISSION ON MENTAL HEALTH TO THE U.S.S.R. 94 (1969) [herein-
after cited as NIMH Special Report]. But as Judge Bazelon has observed, bureaucratic self-
scrutiny tends to be less than aggressively critical in any political context. Id. at 94-95. The
Soviets also argue that the system is fair because psychiatrists have no non-medical incentives
and that a person's relatives and peers would object to any mistaken commitment. Id. at 94.
This argument, however, ignores the inevitably political content of judgments about mental
illness and its hazards, as well as the deep-seated cultural and ideological bias against challeng-
ing State authority.
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criteria that have been sharply criticized for their vagueness. 173 Yet
these criteria are actually more specific than the brief tests, characteristic
of American civil commitment statutes, that typically focus on mental
illness, grave disability, and physical dangerousness to self or others. 174
The 1971 directive opens with a call for "urgent hospitalization" of
any person "mentally ill" and "dangerous to society or to himself."1 75
Western and Soviet dissident critics have condemned the criterion of so-
cial dangerousness as deviously ambiguous. 176 In the peculiar context of
Soviet social life, however, it has come to have a discernible meaning,
inclusive of not only physical dangerousness but also an active propensity
to challenge State authority or to express ideas not officially accept-
able. 177 That such tendencies are treated as threats to society may offend
the liberal sensibility, for which such challenges are symptoms of a
robust political and social life. But unsavoriness is not the same as
vagueness. Within the anti-pluralist Soviet cultural and ideological envi-
ronment, the criterion of social dangerousness is capable of principled
application.178
Unlike American civil commitment statutes, the 1971 Soviet directive
lists in some detail the psychiatric conditions held to pose a "danger to
society."'179 Six categories of illness are set forth. The category relevant
for cases of political dissent specifies "hypochondriac delirious condi-
tions, which cause the patient's incorrect aggressive behavior toward cer-
tain persons, organizations and institutions."' 80 The directive also
173. See, eg., AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 1, at 5 (citing psychiatrists' criticism
of the criteria as obscure and medically imprecise).
174. See Civil Commitment, supra note 166, at 1201-07 (discussion of American involun-
tary commitment standards).
175. Instruction on Hospitalization, supra note 162, at 195.
176. See S. BLOCH & P. REDDAWAY, supra note 5; V. NEKIPELOV, supra note 104.
177. Cf. Reich, The World ofSoviet Psychiatry, N.Y. Times, Jan. 30, 1983, § 6 (Magazine),
at 25 ("because of the nature of political life in the Soviet Union and the social perceptions
fashioned by that life, dissenting behavior really does seem strange there").
178. By "principled" I mean here merely a discernible rule, precise enough to direct a
decision when applied to a particular situation, irrespective of whether we believe the decision
or the principle to be just.
179. In this respect, the 1971 directive differs from a 1961 edict that it replaced. The
earlier directive listed four classes of illness, but added that these "are not exhaustive...
merely an enumeration of the socially dangerous conditions which occur most frequently."
Urgent Hospitalization of the Socially Dangerous Mentally Ill, Oct. 10, 1961, Instruction
from the USSR Ministry of Public Health, reprinted in A. PODRABINEK, supra note 80, at 200.
The 1971 instruction restructured these categories, adding explicit mention of suicidal tenden-
cies and manic and depressive conditions, along with more detailed specification of psychotic
symptoms and mention of organic brain damage. It also eliminated the open-ended statement
that the listed conditions "are not exhaustive." After 1971, apparently, psychiatrists ordering
commitments were required to diagnose a listed condition. Instruction on Hospitalization,
supra note 162, at 195.
180. Instruction on Hospitalization, supra note 162, at 195. The 1971 instruction substi-
tuted the term "behavior" for the word "attitude" in an otherwise identical category set out in
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cautions darkly that these conditions "may be accompanied by
outwardly correct behavior and dissimulation." "[E]xtreme caution,"
the document warns, is therefore required "in evaluating the mental con-
dition of such persons in order to prevent socially dangerous acts by the
mentally ill through timely hospitalization without broadenink the indi-
cations for urgent hospitalization."18 1
The message to psychiatrists is clear. "Behavior" that challenges indi-
viduals and institutions in authority is, per se, a sign of socially danger-
ous mental disturbance. If faced with a "clinical" history of such
behavior, psychiatrists are to remain scrupulously sensitive to the possi-
bility that an examinee's seeming normality during an interview may veil
a propensity to mount such challenges in the future. When in doubt, the
directive suggests, doctors are to err in favor of preventive detention. In
short, Soviet criteria for civil commitment invite an administrative end
run around the criminal law reforms of the Khrushchev era, in service of
political repression.
2. Procedures for Civil Commitment
The administrative mechanism of civil commitment further facilitates
this end run around the criminal law. Security organs, including the
KGB, frequently initiate the commitment process by contacting psychi-
atric clinics to ask that persons be examined.' 8 2 These authorities also
supply "clinical" evidence. This has included letters written to govern-
ment agencies, applications for permission to emigrate, evidence of pub-
lic statements deemed anti-Soviet, and banned literature allegedly
circulated by an examinee.18 3 To order an initial (urgent) commitment, a
the 1961 version, see A. PODRABINEK, supra note 80, at 200. The change perhaps reflects
some level of official awareness that subjective commitment criteria are a threat to "socialist
legality."
181. Instruction on Hospitalization, supra note 162, at 196. This warning seems curiously
inconsistent with another provision of the directive:
In cases where socially dangerous behavior of a person leads to suspicion of a mental
disorder which is not apparent, such a person is not subject to urgent hospitalization.
These persons, if detained in connection with socially dangerous behavior by the appro-
priate agencies, are subject to psychiatric examination as established by criminal
procedure.
Id. at 196. The latter provision-not included in the 1961 version, see A. PODRABINEK, supra
note 80-appears to reflect an awareness of civil commitment's vulnerability to lawless use as a
means for Stalin-style administrative internment, circumventing the Khrushchev-era reforma-
tion of Soviet criminal law. See supra text accompanying notes 69-77. The tension between
this provision and the former warning is not resolved elsewhere in the document; thus the
result is an incoherence of conflicting aims.
182. See, eg., S. BLOCH & P. REDDAWAY, supra note 5, at 161-62 (KGB requested psy-
chiatric examination of religious dissident Gennady Shimanov); cf. M. Field, supra note 47, at
3-4 (asserting that security organs "suggest" to psychiatric institutions that persons be
committed).
183. See M. Field, supra note 47, at 4.
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psychiatrist (or general physician in localities without psychiatric institu-
tions) need only "provide a detailed explanation of medical and social
indications for urgent hospitalization." 18 4 Paramedical workers, along
with MVD security personnel, are then authorized to execute the com-
mitment over the resistance of the patient or others.
Within twenty-four hours, a commission of three psychiatrists is sup-
posed to examine the patient to determine "the appropriateness of the
hospitalization" and "whether further stay at the hospital is neces-
sary."185 Within twenty-four hours of this examination, the patient's
closest relatives are supposed to be informed of the hospitalization. 86
But according to Amnesty International, breaches of these requirements
are common. 187 Relatives are frequently not notified within the required
period and, in many cases, psychiatric commissions have failed to ex-
amine dissenters within a day of the initial detention.188 The authorities
have seized individuals on the streets or at their places of work and in-
terned them without even an initial psychiatric examination. 1 9 In the
case of the celebrated biologist Zhores Medvedev, authorities resorted to
a series of almost comic ruses to lure their "patient" into a "voluntary"
psychiatric exam.190
Once committed, patients must be reexamined at least once a month
by a commission of three psychiatrists. Discharge is conditioned upon:
(1) elimination of the patient's "danger to society" and (2) agreement of
relatives or a guardian to be "responsible for his care."' 9' More invidi-
ously, the 1971 directive provides that before discharge the hospital must
inform a central "psychoneurological center where all such patients must
be specifically registered and subject to systematic treatment if neces-
sary."192 This central registry, from which an ex-internee has no means
184. Instruction on Hospitalization, supra note 162, at 196-97. This procedure is substan-
tially similar to typical urgent commitment procedures in the U.S.
185. Id. at 197.
186. Id.
187. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 1, at 5.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. These included a home visit by a psychiatrist who purported to be a school official
concerned over the behavior of Medvedev's son. According to Medvedev, the "official" asked
detailed questions about his family; later, after three policemen and a psychiatrist had seized
Medvedev from his apartment, another psychiatrist revealed that his commitment was based
on the diagnosis reached by this doctor-in-disguise. S. BLOCH & P. REDDAWAY, supra note 5,
at 172-75. Medvedev was eventually examined by a visiting psychiatric panel that included
two doctors from the Serbsky. He was given the diagnosis of "sluggish schizophrenia" with
"paranoid delusions of reforming society" and was held for 19 days. Id. at 173-81.





to get his name removed, facilitates close monitoring of dissenters' activi-
ties, rendering them especially vulnerable to successive internments. 193
Moreover, like persons released from criminal commitment, they may be
prophylactically interned during high-profile public events. 194
In no known case has a dissenter, confined via the civil commitment
route, been allowed access to a lawyer.195 The directive confers no such
right. Nor does the directive articulate any other patients' rights. The
only provision in the document for enforcement of its few procedural
requirements is the statement that "[c]hief physicians of psychiatric insti-
tutions must exercise systematic supervision of compliance .... ,,196
Without even an administrative procedure for patients (or families) to
appeal the decisions made about their lives, this call for bureaucratic self-
policing 97 provides patients with tenuous protection. Soviet civil com-
mitment procedures, in short, leave mental health and security authori-
ties remarkably free to confine citizens without heed to even the limited
conception of due process reflected in Soviet criminal procedure.
IV. Dissent as Disease: The Evolution of Psychiatric Theory in the
Soviet Union
The criminal and administrative law of involuntary psychiatric con-
finement in the post-Stalinist era has created room for the separate emer-
gence of an approach to forensic diagnosis that lends an enticing
scientific validity to the conceptualization of dissent as disease. It is a
peculiar irony that the diagnostic system Soviet doctors invoke today to
commit dissenters to psychiatric wards rests ultimately upon a Darwin-
ian premise of genetic doom. The radical environmentalism of Pavlov,
along with its symbolic force as a justification for the political authority
of Soviet psychiatry, still retains its hold on Soviet psychotherapy. But it
exists now in an uneasy relationship with a bleaker, biological model of
deviant behavior. Western critics of Soviet psychiatry generally dismiss
this model as a pseudotheory, consciously and cynically crafted to ration-
alize totalitarian repression.1 98 There is, however, ample basis to believe
that this model has played a genuine and powerful role in the Soviet view
193. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 1, at 6.
194. See S. BLOCH & P. REDDAWAY, supra note 5, at 101-02.
195. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 1, at 5-6.
196. Instruction on Hospitalization, supra note 162, at 197.
197. See NIMH Special Report, supra note 172, at 94-96 (rejection of Soviet claim that
such self-policing suffices to prevent abuses).
198. See supra note 12.
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of dissent as disease. An exploration of this role is essential to an under-
standing of why clinicians in the Soviet Union systematically do things
abhorrent to most of their colleagues elsewhere.
A. A Genetic Theory Emerges: The Snezhnevsky System
The great strength of the triumphant Pavlovian theory of the early
1950's was its promise of infinite behavioral plasticity-a promise that
affirmed Marx's hopeful premise that all social ills were the product of
class exploitation and would thus wither away with the emergence of
socialism. 199 Armed with Pavlovian therapeutic technology, psychia-
trists could actively aid in this withering away-they could be Leninist
agents of revolutionary change. But the Pavlovian model offered little to
explain the persistence of social ills in the face of sustained Leninist social
action. During the early post-Stalin years, this deficiency became more
palpable.
1. Politics and Psychopharmacology
The official Soviet rhetoric of the Khrushchev period reflected an ide-
alistic focus on socialist construction which has not since been dupli-
cated. Yet the common ills of Soviet life did not seem to wither away
with successive reforms. Street crime, petty corruption, and alcoholism
continued to fester. Despite earlier claims that mental illness was vanish-
ing,2°° psychiatric problems, including schizophrenia, did not simply dis-
appear. Thus, by the late 1950's, the Pavlovian gloss on the traditional
explanation-socially undesirable "conditioning" due to lingering, pre-
revolutionary imperialist and capitalist influences-seemed tarnished by
age: Had not forty years of "socialist construction" been enough to
eliminate these influences? The Pavlovian paradigm retained a limited
power to "explain" special cases. Some dissidents had been reared in
families "contaminated" by foreign influences (e.g., parents who had
lived abroad), while others grew up in environments tainted by the lin-
gering Soviet dilemma of reigious faith. But where such environmental
contamination could not be'found, Pavlovian explanations seemed dis-
turbingly inadequate.
Within this political context, Soviet psychiatrists began to assimilate
some remarkable Western developments in pharmacology. In 1950, a
French chemist searching for agents to potentiate the effects of surgical
anesthesia synthesized the drug chlorpromazine. 201 Two years later,
199. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
200. See, eg., supra note 62 (1952 claim that schizophrenia had been eradicated).
201. Byck, Drugs and the Treatment of Psychiatric Disorders, in THE PHARMACOLOGICAL




French clinical researchers announced that they had administered this
drug to mental patients and had achieved amelioration of psychotic
symptoms (delusions and hallucinations). 20 2  A burst of psycho-
pharmacological research over the next several years confirmed chlor-
promazine's efficacy as a treatment for the symptoms of schizophrenia
and other psychoses.20 3 Other antipsychotic drugs, including haloper-
idol,2 4 were synthesized and tested with dramatic results. This
psychopharmacological revolution made all other approaches to the
treatment of psychotic disease suddenly seem obsolete. In the Soviet
Union as in the West, psychiatrists once burdened by an inability to bet-
ter the lot of legions of psychotic patients rapidly and broadly applied the
new therapies.
The psychopharmacological revolution of the 1950's had a different
significance for the development of a diagnostic approach to dissent. To
many research psychiatrists, the bewildering psychotic symptoms and
personality traits of schizophrenics, considered by various schools as pri-
marily the consequence of an aberrant early childhood, a disturbed fam-
ily environment,20 5 or a diseased social structure,20 6 seemed abruptly
recast as a biochemical mystery.20 7 In the late 1950's and early 1960's,
some of these researchers raised the question of a genetic predisposition
to schizophrenia. They scrutinized data reported by proponents of vari-
ous environmental etiologies20 8 and suggested that genetic hypotheses
could also explain these results. They pointed to earlier evidence of a
direct relationship between the genetic closeness of relatives and concor-
dant incidence of schizophrenia,20 9 and began an expanded program of
research.
During the late 1950's, genetic approaches to schizophrenia made little
official headway within Soviet psychiatry. Until the defrocking of
Lysenko in the early 1960's, an intense animosity toward hereditarian
202. See id.
203. See id.
204. Id. at 153.
205. See, e.g., Lidz, Schizophrenia and the Family, 21 PSYCHIATRY 21, 24 (1958).
206. See, eg., the Marxist-Pavlovian approach. See also Hollingshead & Redlich, Social
Stratification and Schizophrenia, 19 AM. Soc. REv. 302 (1954) (schizophrenia much more
prevalent in lower than in upper classes, implying etiologic role of lower class environment).
207. See, e.g., Kety, Biochemical Theories of Schizophrenia (Pt. I), 129 SCIENCE 1528
(1959); Kety, Biochemical Theories of Schizophrenia (Pt. II), supra, at 1590.
208. See, e.g., Hollingshead & Redlich, supra note 206.
209. See, e.g., F. KALLMANN, HEREDITY IN HEALTH AND MENTAL DISORDER: PRINCI-
PLES OF PSYCHIATRIC GENETICS IN THE LIGHT OF COMPARATIVE TWIN STUDIES (1953).
Even before the advent of antipsychotic drugs, genetic approaches to schizophrenia had been
urged, though they received relatively little attention. See Kallnann, The Genetic Theory of
Schizophrenia, 103 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 309 (1946).
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ideas permeated the Soviet scientific establishment. 210 Yet many scien-
tists remained quietly aware of Lysenkoism's great cost to progress in
agriculture and other biological fields. And the Lysenkoists apparently
made no effort to restrain the wide use of antipsychotic drugs. Soviet
psychiatrists continued to pay homage to Pavlov. But the success of
drug treatment for schizophrenia, along with the inability of Pavlovian
theory to explain the persistence of a myriad of social ills, suggested that
the Pavlovian paradigm alone was inadequate. Since this paradigm was
the scientific incarnation of the Marxist dream that all social ills would
wither away with the creation of socialism, this inadequacy had a funda-
mental political significance.
The Soviet leadership sensed this problem. In 1959, Khrushchev sig-
naled a radical revision of the Marxist-Leninist line on the social origins
of all deviant behavior. Certain "offenses," he proclaimed, were the
product not of class tension and exploitation but of "abnormal
minds. ' 211 "Can there be diseases, nervous disorders among certain peo-
ple in the Communist society?" he asked. "Evidently there can be ...
To those who might start calling for opposition to Communism on this
'basis,' we can say that now, too, there are people who fight against Com-
munism . . . but clearly the mental state of such people is not nor-
mal."' 212 This frequently quoted comment contained an implicit premise
that political dissent was merely a sign of hereditary taint. If Lysenko
did not then suspect his ultimate fate, he surely ought to have. A few
years later, the inevitable occurred, and Soviet psychiatrists were free to
follow Khrushchev's signal to devise hereditarian explanations for all
sorts of unwanted behavior.
2. Cues from the West: "Genetic Spectrum" Models of
Schizophrenia
Meanwhile, Western researchers were reporting results that substan-
tially strengthened the case for a genetic predisposition to schizophre-
nia.21 3 From these studies, designed to examine genetic factors isolated
from environmental circumstances, some Western enthusiasts of the
210. See generally Z. MEDVEDEV, THE RISE AND FALL OF T. D. LYSENKO (1969).
211. S. BLOCH & P. REDDAWAY, supra note 5, at 62 (quoting from May 24, 1959 Pravda
report).
212. Id.
213. A series of studies done in the United States, Europe, and Japan during the early and
middle 1960's demonstrated a much higher incidence of the disease in identical than in frater-
nal twins of schizophrenics. See J. PINCUS & G. TUCKER, BEHAVIORAL NEUROLOGY 102-03
(2d ed. 1978). Identical (monozygotic) twins share virtually all their genetic material, while
fraternal (dizygotic) twins share only 25%, no more than other siblings. A study of adults
born to schizophrenic mothers but permanently separated from them during the first few days
of life (and placed in foster homes) revealed a significantly higher incidence of the disease in




hereditarian hypothesis concluded flatly that schizophrenia is a "genetic
disease. '2 14 Such studies, two reviewers proclaimed, "offer no support
for the view that the psychosocial environment plays any role in deter-
mining the risk of developing schizophrenia in individuals who are, ge-
netically, at high risk."215
In fact, the data were hardly so unequivocal. Critics of the genetic
hypothesis could point to lingering environmental influences that the
studies had failed to factor out.21 6 In addition, the fact that schizophre-
nia concordance rates for identical (monozygotic) twins were nowhere
near one hundred percent strongly suggested that psychosocial factors
were somehow involved.2 17 A more restrained assessment was offered by
another reviewer in 1975. "These genetic studies," he concluded, "now
provide strong but not conclusive evidence for a biological substrate of
schizophrenia. '218
Yet the entrepreneurs of a new science of psychogenetics went further.
They debated the competitive merits of polygenic and single gene theo-
ries, and they speculated on the combined phenotypic effects of genes for
schizophrenia and for "personality, adaptability, and other functions. '21 9
Moreover, they attempted to apply these etiologic notions to rationalize
the confusing world of psychiatric diagnosis.
Psychiatrists have long sensed, from their clinical experience, some
rough similarities between the cognitive, emotional, and behavioral quali-
ties of patients carrying the diagnosis of schizophrenia and of persons
believed to possess a variety of less severe disorders. The official diagnos-
tic manual of the American Psychiatric Association (APA) declares that
schizophrenics suffer from "characteristic disturbances" in "content and
form of thought, perception, affect, sense of self, volition, relationship to
a few days of birth. Heston, Psychiatric Disorders in Foster Home Reared Children of Schizo-
phrenic Mothers, 112 BRrr. J. PSYCHIATRY 819 (1966). Moreover, other serious psychiatric
problems, including personality disorders and alcoholism, were reportedly much more com-
mon in the former group. Id. at 824.
214. J. PINCUS & G. TUCKER, supra note 213, at 106.
215. Id.
216. These environmental influences included: (1) the possibility of a much greater simi-
larity between the childhood experiences of identical twins than of fraternal twins; (2) early
post-natal environmental experiences (before foster home or adoptive placement); and (3) a
systematic difference between foster home (or adoptive) placements for infants who did and
did not eventually develop schizophrenia (such a difference could have resulted from socioeco-
nomic or other differences among natural mothers).
217. Based on flimsy evidence---and a dubiously relevant analogy with epilepsy-Pincus
and Tucker attempt to explain this discrepancy by asserting that some "acquired brain dam-
age" during pregnancy or early childhood may be necessary for "full expression of the gene."
J. PINCUS & G. TUCKER, supra note 213, at 106-07.
218. Byck, supra note 201, at 155.
219. See J. PINCUS & G. TUCKER, supra note 213, at 107; see also E. SLATER & V. COWIE,
THE GENETICS OF MENTAL DISORDERS (1971) (analyzing genetic theories about the etiology
of various psychiatric illnesses).
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the external world, and psychomotor behavior," but cautions that "no
single feature is invariably present or seen only in Schizophrenia." 220
Frankly psychotic symptoms-delusions and hallucinations-pose the
diagnostic problem of distinguishing between schizophrenia and other se-
vere, disabling psychoses 221 But other qualities of schizophrenia
(blunted emotional expressiveness; social withdrawal or isolation;
"metaphorical," "overelaborate," or "digressive" speech; "odd or bizarre
ideation;" "superstitiousness;"9 "magical thinking;" "overvalued ideas;"
and paranoid delusions)222 blend seamlessly with signs of common, psy-
chiatrically defined personality disorders223 and with anti-social, creative,
stubborn, or reflective quirks of character that even most psychiatrists
would acknowledge as normal.224
The psychogeneticists pointed to this continuum and purported to ex-
plain it. They proposed a genetic "spectrum" of schizophrenic and re-
lated disorders:225 a "continuum from. . . schizophrenia to personality
disorder, alcoholism, eccentricity, and even talent .... -226 The con-
cept has a tempting elegance. It is, in the words of one of its critics,
Walter Reich,
particularly attractive ... from a theoretical point of view, since it pro-
vides not only a relatively parsimonious and unifying etiological theory,
220. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL
OF MENTAL DISORDERS 182 (3d ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as DSM-III].
221. DSM-III diagnostic classifications for psychotic symptoms include Schizoaffective
and Schizophreniform Disorders as well as Brief Reactive Psychosis. See id. at 181-93, 199-
203. These classifications are overlapping and, according to critics, quite arbitrary. They rep-
resent an attempt to organize psychotic processes into discrete diagnostic groups in the ab-
sence of a "known etiology or pathophysiological process." Id. at 7.
222. Id. at 189-91.
223. These include, among others, the Paranoid, Schizoid, Schizotypal, Avoidant, and An-
tisocial Personality Disorders. Id. at 305-30.
224. Even beliefs that psychiatrists analyze as delusional in some settings are not inter-
preted as psychotic dysfunction. The classic example is religious conviction, which alleviates
distress, one psychiatrist writes, by altering reality. It is a "wish-fulfilling delusion" that may
yield "sustained feelings of delusional superiority or entitlement." With faith that "'Jesus
lives inside of me and answers all my prayers,'. . . unpleasant feelings are replaced with their
opposites." The result "can be highly adaptive." G. VAILLANT, supra note 36, at 383. But
what is the difference, psychologically, between "Jesus lives inside of me and answers all my
prayers," and "I am Jesus?" Conventional psychodynamic psychiatry suggests no psychody-
namic distinction. According to the APA's DSM-III, religious faith is not a delusion only
because a belief, to be delusory, must be one not "ordinarily accepted by other members of the
person's culture or subculture." DSM-III, supra note 220, at 356. As it did with the issue of
whether homosexuality is a disease, the APA settled the matter by majority vote. Thus, ac-
cording to APA diagnostic criteria, religious faith, in a society of committed, atheistic Marx-
ists, is a symptom of psychotic disease.
225. See Kety, Rosenthal, Wender & Schulsinger, The Types and Prevalence of Mental
Illness in the Biological and Adoptive Families of Adopted Schizophrenics, in THE TRANSMIS-
SION OF SCHIZOPHRENIA 345 (D. Rosenthal & S. Kety eds. 1968).
226. Eisenberg, The Interaction of Biological and Experiential Factors in Schizophrenia, in




but, also, through its research, a method of delimiting the outer boundaries
of the genetic spectrum, and of testing whether or not specific clinical states
hypothesized as lying within those boundaries do in fact do so.2 2 7
Yet this reach toward outer genetic boundaries poses potentially un-
bounded dangers when the spectrum concept is applied to diagnostic
practice.228 It invites a dramatic expansion of the clinical idea of schizo-
phrenia beyond frank psychosis to personality deviations2 29 and even
normality. Indeed, some have argued that certain normal thought
processes are phenomenologically schizophrenic, and, during periods of
stress, these processes may briefly become so prominent that differentia-
tion from schizophrenic psychosis becomes difficult.230 The spectrum
concept could render such differentiation unnecessary.
In the abstract, a genetically grounded widening of the concept of
schizophrenia does not per se pose a danger. But in the real world con-
text of clinical diagnosis, there are several hazards. First, in general, ge-
netic theories nurture therapeutic and political abdication. While a bleak
outlook may be justified for the classic schizophrenic psychosis, 231 the
spectrum concept's focus on genetic explanation for many non-psychotic
mental styles encourages unwarranted therapeutic nihilism. 232 More
broadly, it suggests (perhaps reassuringly, but also inaccurately) that
neither a society nor its "afflicted" individuals are responsible for these
styles or their social consequences. Second, the debilitating labeling ef-
fects of a schizophrenic diagnosis, 233 shackled to its bearer by chains of
genetic inevitability, are extended to the eccentric, the mildly troubled,
and the talented234 by virtue not of demonstrably profound disability but
by virtue of a hypothetical vulnerability. Diagnosis, as Reich notes, is
not merely an act of scientific classification; it is "an act of clinical inter-
vention." 235 Diagnosis has a myriad of non-clinical implications. It af-
fects a person's legal status, economic opportunities, social standing, and
self-image, as well as the credibility of her ideas. Third, the spectrum
concept invites an invidious form of clinical distortion. Research diag-
nosticians, as Reich notes, are deliberately kept blind as to their subjects'
227. Reich, The Spectrum Concept of Schizophrenia: Problems for Diagnostic Practice, 32
ARcHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 489, 490 (1975).
228. Id. at 490-92.
229. Reich cites several American studies reporting up to 15% incidence of personality
deviations that are candidates for inclusion in a proposed genetic spectra. Id. at 491.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 490.
232. See id. (pessimism less justifiable for non-psychotic disease entities on schizophrenic
spectrum).
233. Id. at 490-91.
234. See supra text accompanying note 226.
235. Reich, supra note 227, at 492.
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family psychiatric histories; this assures that their diagnostic judg-
ments-intended to test genetic hypotheses-will not be biased by aware-
ness of psychiatrically troubled relatives. In clinical practice, though, a
diagnostician knows the patient's family history. If the doctor adheres to
the spectrum paradigm, awareness of even mild psychopathology in some
distant relative may encourage her to interpret slight personal quirks as
spectrum symptomatology.236
3. The Soviet Enshrinement of a Spectrum Theory
The genetic spectrum paradigm has remained largely a research con-
cept in the West. Sensitivity to the moral hazards discussed above, the
persistence of environmental explanations, 237 and the absence of compel-
ling neurophysiological or biochemical evidence in favor of genetic hy-
potheses have restrained most psychiatrists from translating spectrum
theory into practice. Western psychiatric pluralism, so frustrating for
many who criticize the proliferation of conflicting paradigms, has not
permitted the enshrinement of any etiologic theory as the basis for diag-
nostic practice.238
The story has been much different in the Soviet Union. After
Khrushchev signaled in 1959 that hereditarian explanations for social
deviance would be politically welcome,2 39 psychiatrists had to wait sev-
eral years, until the fall of Lysenko, to safely pursue genetic inquiries. 240
But they made up for their late start with the enthusiasm of recent
converts.
a. The Political Triumph of Andrei Snezhnevsky
The leading enthusiast of the genetic spectrum theory in the Soviet
Union was schizophrenia researcher Andrei V. Snezhnevsky. Snezhnev-
sky had climbed rapidly through the most prestigious ranks of Soviet
psychiatry during the 1940's and 1950's.241 He was, in Reich's less-than-
complimentary words,
a prototypical product of Stalinist and post-Stalinist Soviet life ... capable
of surviving shifts and feints in theory and power and of coming out on top
while others less skilled than he in organizational maneuvering or in sensing
236. Id. at 491.
237. See, e.g., T. LIDz, THE ORIGIN AND TREATMENT OF SCHIZOPHRENIc DISORDERS
(1973) (schizophrenogenic family theory).
238. The dominant American diagnostic system explicitly disavows reliance upon any the-
ory of etiology or pathogenesis. See supra note 221.
239. See supra text accompanying notes 211-12.
240. See supra text accompanying notes 212-14.
241. Reich, Psychiatric Diagnosis as an Ethical Problem, in PSYCHIATRIC ETHIcs 66 (S.




the most advantageous political and ideological loyalties-less skilled than
he or more principled-lost prominence or found themselves denounced,
purged, or worse.2 42
In 1962, Snezhnevsky was named to Soviet psychiatry's loftiest post,
Director of the Institute of Psychiatry of the Academy of Medical Sci-
ences.243 In an ironic twist on Lysenkoism, Snezhnevsky aggressively
used his power to promulgate a genetic spectrum theory of schizophrenic
illness and to assure its almost uniform nationwide application in clinical
and forensic practice. He did this not by crude coercion, but by deftly
using the highly centralized authority of his post to shape the content of
publications and teaching programs, to channel research and training
funds, and to bestow or withhold other academic opportunities and hon-
ors.244 His methods were akin to those of an entrepreneurial American
university department chairman,245 but the domain of his authority was
nationwide and officially sanctioned by the State. By the middle 1970's,
according to Walter Reich, the Snezhnevsky system had become the
standard Soviet approach to the diagnosis of schizophrenia and many
other purportedly related classes of psychopathology. 246
b. The Snezhnevsky Spectrum Theory
Snezhnevsky's theory itself is not nearly as remarkable as his political
triumph. He was a latecomer to research on the question of a genetic
basis for schizophrenia, and his spectrum model drew its essence from
Western theories.247 Snezhnevsky's basic notion is that schizophrenias
are divisible into three genetically distinctforms. Within each form lies a
242. Reich, supra note 139, at 34-35.
243. Reich, supra note 241, at 66.
244. For example, Snezhnevsky edited the nation's only psychiatric journal, the Korsakov
Journal of Neuropathology and Psychiatry. In the 1940's and 1950's, he selected and trained
numerous eventual leaders of Soviet psychiatry during his tenure as a faculty member and then
as chairman of the Department of Psychiatry of the Central Postgraduate Medical Institute,
the nation's most prestigious center for advanced research training. This position also allowed
him to influence government ministries' allocations of resources for psychiatric research and
education. Reich, supra note 241, at 66. Moreover, Snezhnevsky exercised firm guidance over
the Serbsky Institute, which has administrative authority over forensic psychiatric examina-
tion throughout the Soviet Union. See Instruction on Forensic Psychiatric Examination, supra
note 97, at 203-08. He won genuine commitment to the validity of his hereditarian theory
from many colleagues and students, including some who later emigrated. Reich, supra note
139, at 35.
245. See L. VEYsEY, THE EMERGENCE OF THE AMERICAN UNIVERSrrY 317-32 (1965)
(chairmen's use of powers of appointment, promotion, and publication to build disciplines in
their images, demanding loyalty and suppressing rival views).
246. Reich, supra note 241, at 66.
247. For Snezhnevsky's own discussion of his system, see Snezhnevsky & Vartanyan, The
Forms of Schizophrenia and Their Biological Correlates, in BIOCHEMISTRY, SCHIZOPHRENIAS,
AND AFFECTIVE ILLNESSES 1 (H. Himwich ed. 1970); Snezhnevsky, The Symptomatology,
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wide continuum of disease severity. The severity of a patient's illness-
its place on one of the three continua-may vary for many environmen-
tal reasons. But the form of a patient's disease is a lifelong, genetic
trait-an incurable diathesis. Thus even the mildest case of a particular
form is deemed capable of developing into the most malignant version.
One form, the "periodic," is of little significance for diagnosis of dis-
senters. It features acute episodes of psychotic symptoms with mood
swings, followed by full returns to previous levels of health. Patients fit-
ting this classification would almost certainly be given schizophrenic or
other psychotic diagnoses by most Western psychiatrists.2 48 There have
been no reports of dissenters interned with this diagnosis.
More politically problematic are the "shift-like" and "continuous"
forms. Persons supposedly suffering from "shift-like" disease experience
acute attacks of illness from which they recover only partially, resulting
in gradual deterioration over the years. Patients with the "continuous"
form develop chronic symptoms at a young age and also follow a gradual
downhill course. Within these two forms, Snezhnevsky separates the
continua of disease intensity into mild, moderate, and severe subtypes.
The moderate and severe subtypes are characterized by clearly psychotic
symptoms that Western clinicians typically interpret as evidence for a
schizophrenic diagnosis.
Persons purportedly suffering from the mild subtypes of "shift-like" or
"continuous" schizophrenia, however, have no psychotic symptoms.
These individuals would probably be diagnosed by non-Soviet practition-
ers not as schizophrenic, but as "neurotic, suffering from a character
(personality) disorder, or even mentally well."' 249 The mild subtype of
the "shift-like" form is characterized by such features as neurotic behav-
ior, "self-absorption," "social contentiousness," and "philosophical con-
cerns" 25 0-criteria that might, at worst, be suggestive of Schizoid,
Avoidant, or Antisocial Personality Disorders, according to the Ameri-
can Psychiatric Association (APA) diagnostic scheme.251 Similarly, the
"continuous" form's mild variant (also termed "sluggish") is character-
ized by "self-consciousness," "introspectiveness," "obsessive doubts,"
Clinical Forms, and Nosology of Schizophrenia, in MODERN PERSPECTIVES IN WORLD PSY-
CHIATRY 425 (J. Howells ed. 1971). See also Reich, supra note 227, at 492; Reich, supra note
241, at 66-70.
248. The "periodic" form corresponds roughly with several DSM-III psychotic diagnoses,
including some of the schizophrenias, Schizoaffective Disorder, and Brief Reactive Psychosis.
See DSM-III, supra note 220.
249. Reich, supra note 241, at 68.
250. Id. at 67.




conflict with authority, and reformism.252 These extremely vague crite-
ria suggest the whole range of spectrum states: from the APA's person-
ality disorders through eccentricity to creative, robust normality.
Thus, under the Snezhnevsky system, an extraordinary range of per-
sonal styles are subject to being construed as schizophrenic disease-
capable, in theory, of degenerating into psychotic dysfunction.
Snezhnevsky's spectrum theory is hardly unique in this regard. The
notion that these styles are schizophrenic and do reflect a risk of
psychotic degeneration is common to Western spectrum theories.253
What is unique, as Reich points out, is the triumph of this theory as
conventional diagnostic wisdom, virtually immune from internal
criticism.254
Snezhnevsky and his supporters defend the wide clinical application of
their spectrum system on the ground that, in contrast to Western re-
search, their research has conclusively shown the validity of spectrum
theories. Since 1962, Snezhnevsky's Institute of Psychiatry has mounted
an intensive program of research into the clinical genetics of schizophre-
nia. Like their Western counterparts, the Institute's investigators have
examined thousands of relatives of schizophrenic patients, searching for
evidence of any psychiatric disorders. They have reported remarkable
results: psychiatric symptoms in these examinees were almost always
252. See Reich, supra note 241, at 67.
253. See supra text accompanying notes 225-30.
254. Under the prevailing American diagnostic scheme, a schizophrenic diagnosis may be
made in the absence of obviously psychotic symptoms. The APA criteria provide for such a
diagnosis if a person with certain schizotypal character traits evinces, without hallucinations
or delusions, "blunted, flat, or inappropriate affect" associated with "incoherence, marked
loosening of associations, markedly illogical thinking, or marked poverty of content of
speech." DSM-III, supra note 220, at 188-89. This exception to the requirement of overtly
psychotic symptoms appears narrow in practice, compared to the Snezhnevsky system's. This
is strongly suggested by the results of a 1972 World Health Organization (WHO) study that
reviewed diagnostic criteria at centers in nine Western, Eastern bloc, and Third World nations.
Diagnoses made by these centers were compared with rediagnoses made by a computer pro-
gram that applied the WHO's International Classification of Diseases (1CD) criteria. See
WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, PUBLIC HEALTH PAPERS No. 63, SCHIZOPHRENIA: A
MULTINATIONAL STUDY (1972). Diagnoses from seven centers closely matched the ICD
rediagnoses. But at Moscow's Institute of Psychiatry (Snezhnevsky's center), schizophrenia
was diagnosed much more frequently than it was when the Moscow patients were rediagnosed
by the ICD-based computer program. This discrepancy was due largely to the Moscow clini-
cians' greater tendency to classify non-psychotic patients as schizophrenic. Applying criteria
from DSM III's immediate predecessor, the only American center in the study also diagnosed
schizophrenia much more frequently. But this gap was due primarily to the American center's
tendency to classify as schizophrenic patients who by ICD criteria fit another psychotic diag-
nosis. See Reich, supra note 227, at 493-96. Interestingly, diagnoses from the only other East-
ern bloc center in the study-Prague--closely matched the ICD diagnoses.
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those characteristic of their schizophrenic relatives' Snezhnevskyan dis-
ease forms. The intensity, or subtype, of afflicted relatives' illnesses va-
ried, but the forms generally "bred true. '255
This research, however, was fundamentally flawed. Unlike Western
investigators, Snezhnevsky's research diagnosticians were not kept blind
to the family psychiatric histories of their subjects. 256 The psychiatrists
who interviewed relatives of diagnosed schizophrenics not only knew
that these examinees had family histories of the disease, but also knew
the particular schizophrenic form which each subject's family member(s)
purportedly had. They also were aware that their Institute's chief, who
had devised and aggressively promoted the theory they were testing, was
hardly impartial as to how he wanted the research to come out. Ob-
taining findings consistent with the spectrum theory could be crucial to
getting an advanced degree or to moving further through the academic
ranks.25 7 Without the protection of being blind to their subjects' family
255. Reich, supra note 177, at 20, 23 (discussing Snezhnevskyan clinical research).
256. See supra text accompanying notes 235-36.
257. The case of Etely P. Kazanetz is an illustration of the hazards of challenging
Snezhnevskyan orthodoxy. Kazanetz was the holder of an advanced research degree and a
prestigious appointment as a research psychiatrist at Moscow's Serbsky Institute, which is
closely linked to Snezhnevsky's Institute of Psychiatry. In 1979, he published findings in an
American journal that were discretely critical of Snezhnevsky's broad conception of schizo-
phrenia. Kazanetz, Differentiating Exogenous Illness From Schizophrenia, 36 ARCHIvES GEN.
PSYCHIATRY 740 (1979). For this bit of daring, -he was abruptly dismissed from his research
post. IAPUP, INFORMATION BULL. No. 2, Oct. 1981, at 10. His subsequent professional fate
is unclear.
In the study that got him into political trouble, he used a computer learning and pattern
recognition program to evaluate the first psychotic episodes of more than 300 patients, most of
whom carried schizophrenic diagnoses. Some of these patients had developed repeated
psychotic breakdowns and worsening, schizophrenic disease. Others, including many labeled
"schizophrenic," had returned quickly to health, with excellent occupational function and no
major psychiatric problems; they were burdened chiefly by the legal consequences of their
diagnoses. Kazanetz hypothesized that only the former group merited a genetically-based
schizophrenic diagnosis. Further, the latter group's breakdowns had resulted from transient
environmental stresses, emotional disorders, and physical illness. Finally, Kazanetz offered
that the groups could be distinguished based on their symptoms at the time of their initial (or
only) psychotic breakdowns. Along with several other psychiatrists, he reviewed follow-up
records spanning up to 20 years after the patients' initial breakdowns, reclassifying the subjects
(based upon pre-Snezhnevsky Soviet criteria) into two categories--"schizophrenia" and "psy-
chosis of exogenous origin." Many of those originally diagnosed as schizophrenic had excel-
lent long-term courses, without major psychiatric problems, and fell into the latter category.
Kazanetz then compared these results with computer rediagnoses made by feeding data to his
pattern recognition program from initial psychotic episodes only. For the overwhelming ma-
jority of patients, the computer rediagnoses accurately "predicted" the reclassifications based
on follow-up data. Kazanetz concluded that accurate distinctions between genetically-based
(schizophrenic) and environmentally-caused (exogenous) psychoses could in fact be made dur-
ing a first psychotic episode, and that Snezhnevsky's "periodic" form of schizophrenia, see
supra note 248, is actually an exogenous psychosis. Without explicitly condemning Snezhnev-
sky's model, Kazanetz criticized "incorrect assessment of pre-morbid personality traits," over-
emphasis of heredity, and inattention to environmental causes of psychosis. Moreover, he
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histories, "it was just too easy for them, even if they were honest, to be
swayed by their mission to prove Snezhnevsky right. '258
4. Forensic Application of the Snezhnevsky System
Soviet forensic psychiatrists aggressively apply Snezhnevsky's broad
conception of schizophrenic disease. The authoritative treatise'on foren-
sic psychiatry cautions against "erroneously" interpreting "[t]he deepen-
ing personality changes" of "slowly developing" schizophrenia
("sluggish" subtype of the "continuous" form) as "character defects. '259
Once a schizophrenic diagnosis has been made, however-even a diagno-
sis of one of the "mild," non-psychotic subtypes-a finding of legal non-
responsibility260 is almost automatic. Even if an accused appears largely
normal, with "only certain morbid symptoms" that seem unrelated to
her alleged "socially dangerous" act, the schizophrenic disease is deemed
to have a global impact upon mental function.261
It would be wrong to think that the morbid schizophrenic process can
strike certain mental functions alone and leave others totally unaf-
fected. . . . Those psychiatrists and jurists are in error who attempt to cast
doubt on the legal irresponsibility of schizophrenics when socially danger-
ous actions cannot be associated with any evident psychopathology. 262
Thus Snezhnevsky's spectrum hypothesis-that persons with seemingly
mild disease are every bit as genetically schizophrenic as the most fulmi-
nantly psychotic patients-is transmuted into a rationale for wholesale
findings of non-responsibility once a spectrum diagnosis is made. In this
way, Soviet forensic psychiatrists finesse--or engulf-the causality com-
ponent of the legal question of responsibility263 by the act of diagnosis.
expressed regret over the cost to "individual rights" from "incorrect" diagnoses of schizophre-
nia. Kazanetz, supra, at 741-45.
258. Reich, supra note 177, at 23.
259. Morozov, Schizophrenia, in FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY, supra note 123, at 197, 223.
260. Such a finding also includes incompetence to stand trial. See supra text accompanying
note 94.
261. Morozov, supra note 259, at 221-22.
262. Id. Even during "prolonged and persistent remissions," schizophrenics are generally
to be found criminally non-responsible. Exceptions may be made only where "personality
changes are so slight that they do not interfere with the person's adaptability," although "pro-
longed and persistant remissions without notable personality changes are comparatively rare."
Id. at 225. Since dissent in the Soviet Union by its very nature interferes with a person's
"adaptability," this exception is extremely unlikely to be invoked for dissidents.
263. See supra text accompanying notes 88-93.
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B. An Older Diagnostic Construct: Paranoid Psychopathy
1. Value-Laden Theory
Existing in an uncertain relation to the mild subtypes of schizophrenia
is the older Soviet diagnosis of "paranoid psychopathy," which is also
conferred upon dissenters.264 In contrast to the Snezhnevskyan schizo-
phrenias, the psychopathies are said to be caused by both genetic and
environmental influences; either may predominate in a particular case.265
Unlike the schizophrenias, they supposedly leave the intellect intact, dis-
torting only the emotional aspects of personality. 266 Soviet psychiatrists
distinguish the psychopathies from normal variants of personality on the
vague ground that only the former involve "relatively permanent and
deeply penetrating anomalous variants" 267 which "hinder . . adapta-
tion of the person to his environment. '268
Paranoid psychopaths are said by the official treatise on forensic psy-
chiatry to be marked by their "unflagging conviction. '269 "They fre-
quently exaggerate their importance and believe that others are paying
attention to them;" this can adversely influence other persons, "espe-
cially if these persons are especially suggestible. '270 They sometimes
"have a passion for scientific invention and reformist work" and are
"convinced of their righteousness. ' 271 But their "projects and plans usu-
ally reveal the narrow range of their interests and knowledge, besides
their erroneous nature. '272 According to the dissident psychiatrist
Semyon Gluzman, the ambiguous coficept of paranoid psychopathy in-
volves, in essence, a developmental process that begins with an "obses-
sive idea"-a preoccupation with some goal.273 As the preoccupied
person meets resistance, his obsession becomes an "over-valued idea...
a notion, usually rational in content . . . the importance of which has
264. See generally Bukovsky & Gluzman, supra note 145.
265. Kerbikov & Felinskaia, Psychopathy, in FoRENsIc PSYCHIATRY, supra note 123, at
393, 394. The authors' catalogue of vaguely described causes includes virtually every possibil-
ity one might imagine: genetic or other congenital events, upbringing, other social condition-
ing, pubertal and senescent hormonal changes, infectious diseases, trauma, and various
intoxications. Id. at 393-95.
266. Id. at 393. Thus psychopathies "are also encountered in gifted people." Id. at 393-
94.
267. Id. at 393.
268. Id. at 394. This imprecise distinction is akin to that in American practice between
personality disorders and normal personality traits: "It is only when personality traits are
inflexible and maladaptive and cause either significant impairment in social or occupational
functioning or subjective distress that they constitute Personality Disorders." DSM-II1, supra
note 220, at 305 (emphasis in original).








been overestimated beyond all reason. '274 The individual progresses
eventually into a "delusional state," featuing a system of "erroneous"
beliefs, "incapable of alteration," and accompanied by "persecution
mania." 275 When forensic psychiatrists diagnose dissidents as paranoid
psychopaths, they typically discern one of two related types of delusional
state: "reformist delusions" (unshakable beliefs that the social system
should be changed) and "litigation mania" (persistent conviction that
one's rights have been violated).276
From a liberal, pluralistic perspective, these characterizations of polit-
ical commitment are preposterous, even comic. But even the concept of
delusion is, in a limited sense, culturally relative-relative enough to
render these characterizations plausible in the Soviet context. To show
this, it is convenient to consider delusory notions as falling into three
classes: (1) bizarre notions of fact (factual beliefs that persons maintain
in the face of conclusive evidence to the contrary); (2) unreasonable no-
tions of fact (factual beliefs maintained in the face of evidence that they
are extremely unlikely to be true); and (3) notions of value (value judg-
ments "so extreme as to defy credibility"). 277
Notions in the first class-e.g., "little green creatures are crawling up
my arms'-are clearly delusory278 in any social or cultural setting. But
some in the second group will not be viewed as delusory in all contexts.
Many religious beliefs are classic examples. In a society of committed
atheists, the notion "Jesus lives inside me and answers all my prayers,"
would seem delusory. In our own society, however, it does not, although
available empirical evidence lends this belief no support. Whether the
belief is a sign of psychosis or is consistent with robust normality is no
more than a question of its social acceptability. 279 The delusory status of
some notions of value is more obviously relative. Whether a value judg-
ment is "so extreme as to defy credibility" depends, of course, on who
determines credibility. In a pluralistic society, it is difficult to imagine a
political preference that might meet this test of incredibility.280 But in a
society used to a single correct system of political belief, or in a society in
which any challenge to authority is regarded with suspicion, dissenting




277. DSM-III, supra note 220, at 356.
278. Strictly speaking, a false sensory perception is a hallucination, while unshakable con-
viction that this perception is accurate is a delusion. Id.
279. See supra note 224.
280. We might hope, though, that some preferences-Nazi racial notions, for instance-
would be thought to "defy credibility" even in a culture of democratic pluralism. Some of us
would view Nazi racial ideas as delusions.
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Thus, in an authoritarian political culture, "reformist delusion" is a
coherent and credible psychiatric concept. So is "litigation mania," in a
society where rights are authoritatively defined by those being litigated
against and where the authorities' denial of a benefit to an individual is
itself construed as convincing evidence that the individual's claim was
untrue.281
2. Forensic Application
Diagnosis of a psychopathy, in contrast to a schizophrenia, does not
virtually always trigger a finding of criminal non-responsibility. 282
Because their intellectual processes are not deemed genetically aber-
rant,2 83 psychopaths are generally considered "capable of correctly eval-
uating external reality and governing their actions .... "284 Thus,
psychopathic disorders usually do not satisfy the causality element of the
legal test for criminal non-responsibility.285 Some poorly defined excep-
tions, however, are described in the official forensic psychiatry text. If
"the character alterations in the psychopathic personality are so deep
that a psychopathic state can justifiably be compared with a state of
mental illness," the person may be found non-responsible. 286 "Such
cases usually involve asthenic [a category into which no dissenter is
known to have been placed2 87] and paranoid psychopaths. '28 8 More-
over, if the accused acted "in a state of deep decompensation or acute
psychopathic reaction," a finding of non-responsibility finding may be
required.289
These vague criteria can hardly provide forensic examiners with genu-
ine guidance. They invite psychiatrists to make their own "gut" judg-
ments about responsibility and then to bury these judgments beneath a
technical-sounding formulation of how some pathologic processes did or
did not cause a criminal act. A dissident who brazenly hoisted a picket
281. In such a society, a fortiori, an individual's conviction that political change is called
for, or that her rights have been violated, may plausibly be perceived as an "overvalued" idea,
see supra text accompanying notes 273-76, which, like a delusion, American practice defines in
part as a belief not "ordinarily accepted by other members of the person's culture or subcul-
ture." DSM-III, supra note 220, at 356.
282. See supra text accompanying notes 88-93.
283. See supra text accompanying notes 265-66.
284. Kerbikov & Felinskaia, supra note 265, at 411.
285. See supra text accompanying notes 88-93.
286. Kerbikov & Felinskaia, supra note 265, at 412.
287. In asthenic psychopathy, a "depressed physical condition and a feeling of physical
languor are combined with a feeling of personal inadequacy, shyness, extreme vulnerability,
and sensitivity." Such patients, "continually dissatisfied with themselves [and] susceptible to
depressions," have difficulty adapting to life's routine stresses. Id. at 396.




sign on Red Square at noon might be described as suffering from an exag-
gerated sense of her own importance and a chronic "passion for ...
reformist work, ' 290 yet still be judged "capable of correctly evaluating
external reality and governing [her] actions," 291 and therefore be held
criminally responsible. Or, the depth of her political conviction might be
cited as proof of "character alterations. . . so deep" 292 as to have inexo-
rably caused her crime, requiring a finding of non-responsibility. There
is still a third possibility: the act itself might be invoked tautologically as
both evidence and a consequence of "a state of deep decompensation or
acute psychopathic reaction, 293 meriting a finding of non-responsibility.
Like a result-oriented judge who selects a few convenient holdings from a
body of conflicting case law, the Soviet psychiatrist can make a decision
first, then pick a convenient technical incantation. The diagnosis of para-
noid psychopathy makes available a potpourri of incongruent formula-
tions with which to articulate the presence or absence of a causal link
between illness and act. Whereas a schizophrenic diagnosis in effect sub-
sumes (and decides) the legal question of causation within the issue of
mental illness,294 paranoid psychopathy makes causality the key question
in the determination of responsibility and gives psychiatrists doctrinal
carte blanche to decide this question behind formulaic veils. 295
C. Forensic Diagnosis and Value Premises
Soviet forensic psychiatrists, in short, follow two evaluative routes to-
ward finding dissenters not criminally responsible. They may invoke a
Snezhnevskyan schizophrenic diagnosis, a move which, according to au-
thoritative doctrine, virtually always settles the issue. Alternatively, they
may discern a paranoid psychopathy and find a causal link to the pro-
scribed act. For civil commitment, diagnosis per se appears to be less
important, owing to the fairly detailed elaboration of mental symptoms
contained in the administrative directive that lays out criteria for com-
mitment.296 This directive states explicitly that psychopathic disorders,
in themselves, are not sufficient grounds for commitment; and it makes
290. See supra text accompanying notes 269-72.
-291. Kerbikov & Felinskaia, supra note 265, at 411.
292. Id. at 396.
293. Id. at 412.
294. See supra text accompanying note 263; see also supra text accompanying notes 88-93.
295. There are no reliable Western estimates of the frequency with which defendants diag-
nosed as paranoid psychopaths-whether dissident or otherwise-are found criminally non-
responsible. The dissenters Vladimir Bukovsky and Semyon Gluzman reported in 1974 that,
according to official Serbsky Institute figures, 95.5% of all defendants with this diagnosis were
found responsible. But the two intimated that the figure may be lower for dissenters. Bukov-
sky & Gluzman, supra note 145, at 428.
296. See supra notes 175-81 and accompanying text.
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no mention of schizophrenia, in itself, as a reason for internment. 297 Yet
the Snezhnevskyan notion that mental processes can, for genetic reasons,
be fundamentally and globally aberrant even without "evident psychopa-
thology"298 may underlie the directive's call for "extreme caution" when
evaluating persons who display "outwardly correct behavior. '299
A particular normative vision of healthy adaptation to life infuses the
psychiatric ideas that Soviet clinicians bring to bear upon dissent. From
our vantage point, we cannot prove, in an empirically compelling way,
that such a vision informs all of what Soviet psychiatrists do. Yet we can
observe, in an anecdotal way, the implicit value choices they make when
they must decide or recommend something, and neither empirical data
nor logical inference from data alone is able to provide them with deter-
minative principles.
One systematic example of such a value choice is the leap Soviet psy-
chiatrists make from the schizophrenic spectrum hypothesis to the crimi-
nal non-responsibility of virtually all whom they place on that spectrum,
whether or not a clinician discerns a relationship between an evident
illness and the alleged act.3°° Even if the same genetic flaw were bio-
chemically proven present in all persons carrying the diagnosis of a given
Snezhnevskyan form-from severely psychotic patients to persons with
mild quirks of character-logic alone would not dictate the conclusion
that all with this flaw are unable to "realize the significance of [their]
actions or control ... them. '30 1 For a person's genotype30 2 has signifi-
cance for her ability to cope with life, physiologically and psychologi-
cally, only to the extent that it influences her phenotype. 30 3 In the
absence of discerned evidence that an accused's phenotype leaves her less
able to "realize the significance of [her] actions or control.., them," the
genotype can be relevant only as a basis for speculation that undiscerned
evidence might exist. This possibility is genuine, given the crudeness and
uncertainty of psychiatric evaluation. Yet the Soviets' leap from possibil-
ity to policy-their general rule, in the face of uncertainty, that persons
supposedly on the schizophrenic spectrum have an impaired ability to
"control" or "realize the significance of" their actions-is not dictated
297. See Instruction on Hospitalization, supra note 162.
298. See supra text accompanying note 262.
299. Instruction on Hospitalization, supra note 162, at 196.
300. See supra text accompanying notes 261-62.
301. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
302. Genotype refers to an organism's genetic endowment.
303. Phenotype refers to the physiologic and anatomic constitution of an organism (a




by logical inference alone. It is a normative judgment, reflecting commit-
ment to some underlying values. The ambiguous diagnosis of paranoid
psychopathy, with its confusing and contradictory mechanistic formula-
tions, also reflects, at bottom, culturally-grounded, normative notions.304
What is the normative vision, or the implicit set of values, that ani-
mates Soviet psychiatry's response to dissent? It has been argued.that a
profound suspicion of any challenge to authority is deeply rooted in Rus-
sian mass culture-so much so that, to the average Soviet citizen and the
average Soviet psychiatrist, dissenters seem bizarre.30 5  Historians of
Russian culture have observed that the Western-oriented, critically-
minded intelligentsia that emerged in the latter part of the nineteenth
century felt bitterly alienated from the Russian people. 30 6 Aleksander
Blok, a leading Russian poet, wrote in 1909 of "two realities: the people
and the intelligentsia; a few hundred million on the one hand, and a few
hundred thousand on the other, unable to understand each other in the
304. See supra text accompanying notes 265-95.
305. Writing with the well-known dissident Vladimir Bukovsky, Gluzman evokes a nor-
mative vision motivating Soviet psychiatry as the "monotonous but tranquil" lifestyle of the
"rentier"-a person above all "unwilling to take chances," with the strongest "instinct for self-
preservation." Convinced that "the higher you fly, the harder you fall," he "never lets himself
get carried away," and "regards his lifestyle as the only correct one and indeed the wisest and
safest one in our existence fraught with adversity." Bukovsky & Gluzman, supra note 145, at
424.
Undoubtedly the dissenter in Soviet life often takes enormous risks, whether in criticizing a
policy of the State, too noticeably following a religious faith, attempting to emigrate, or claim-
ing that some personal right has been flouted by the State. To the average Soviet citizen,
living in "the land of single file," see Reich, The Land of Single File, THE WILSON QUAR-
TERLY, Autumn 1983, at 47, these risks may seem incomprehensible-the product of a malad-
justed mind with a contorted sense of reality. Such incomprehension isolates the dissenter
from his peers, hiking the hazards of persisting in dissent, and in turn reinforcing its incompre-
hensibility. To persevere, the dissenter must become even more single-minded, losing friends
(and perhaps family), career opportunities, and even physical freedom. Certain emotional re-
actions are inevitable as a result of this cycle, including fear, suspiciousness, depression, ambiv-
alence, and guilt. See Reich, supra note 139, at 34. Thus, when psychiatrically examined by
the authorities, the dissenter's embattled commitment to an officially frowned-upon belief or
goal may easily seem an obsession, an overvalued idea, or even a delusion. And the dissenter's
fears, suspiciousness, ambivalence, and guilt may seem proof of inherent pathology, instead of
a normal and understandable response to extraordinary stress.
306. See, ag., J. BILLINGTON, THE ICON AND THE AXE: AN INTERPRETATIVE HISTORY
OF RUSSIAN CULTURE 388-90 (1966); Raeff, Russia's Perception of Her Relations With the
West, in THE STRUCTURE OF RUSSIAN HISTORY: INTERPRETATIVE ESSAYS 261 (M.
Cherniavsky ed. 1970). Historians have debated whether this estrangement of intellectuals
from the masses was something uniquely Russian or whether it had parallels in other societies.
Roberts, Russia and the West: A Comparison and Contrast, in id. at 251.
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most fundamental things. ' 30 7 The Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 was op-
posed by most members of the tiny intelligentsia, 308 which was decimated
by successive Stalinist purges. Thus Soviet bureaucrats and professionals
have been products of the anti-intellectual mass tradition. No compre-
hensive empirical study has explored the attitudes of the average Soviet
functionary toward authority and dissent. 30 9 But the mirror image of
Russian intellectuals' estrangement from popular culture and bureau-
cracy is surely an equally great cultural antipathy toward the in-
tellectuals.
Snezhnevsky's schizophrenic spectrum model provides a doctrinal tool
for the transmutation of such prejudices into diagnosis. Moreover, the
general rule that Snezhnevskyan schizophrenics are not criminally re-
sponsible, even in the absence of an overt link between illness and act,
converts the lack of clinical comprehension of dissenters' sacrifice and
commitment into a wholesale discrediting of the dissenters' words and
deeds. The overlapping and vague concept of paranoid psychopathy
more flexibly, if perhaps less credibly, accommodates a clinician's gut
prejudices about a particular case; its supermarket of contradicting for-
mulations offers doctrinal tools for any disposition a clinician, or those
with influence over him, might prefer.
The infusion of conventional prejudices about healthy life into psychi-
atric doctrine is certainly not a uniquely Soviet phenomenon. 310 Within
any culture, conventional lay and psychiatric notions of mental health
are likely to reflect an adaptive balance between "daring to live"311 and
knowing "when to stop. ' 312 By our standards, the balance Soviet psychi-
atrists "enforce" in their interactions with dissenters seems bizarrely
askew. But that balance is, at least in part, a plausible product of Soviet
ideology and-perhaps even more importantly-classic Russian distrust
of pluralistic individualism.
307. Blok, The People and the Intelligentsia, in RUSSIAN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY: AN
ANTHOLOGY 359, 360 (M. Raeff ed. 1966).
308. Monas, The Revelation of Saint Boris: Russian Literature and Individual Autonomy,
in THE STRUCTURE OF RUSSIAN HISToRY: INTERPRETATIVE ESSAYS, supra note 306, at 412,
420.
309. But cf M. MEAD, SOVIET ATTITUDES TOWARD AUTHORITY (1951) (an empirical
study "at a distance," employing officially published materials).
310. In the most comprehensive longitudinal study of healthy Americans' adaptation to
life's stresses, the psychiatrist George Vaillant acknowledges at the outset that his "correlatives
of healthy adaptation" may seem "confounded with the tenets of Horatio Alger and the Boy
Scouts of America." G. VAILLANT, supra note 36, at 17. At the end of the study, he con-
cludes that "[t]he healthy individual is a conservative. . . capable of. . . assessing personal
costs." Id. at 374.
311. Id. at 370.




V. Implications For International Human Rights Activism
A. The Current Style of Activism: Confrontation and Castigation
For most of the active critics of Soviet psychiatry, proof that men and
women, mentally healthy by Western standards, have been confined to
mental institutions against their will defines a simple problem of good
and evil. Certain that psychiatry provides objective standards by which
to discern health, disease, and dangerousness, they have mounted a cru-
sade of condemnation against Snezhnevsky and his followers, prosecu-
tors, police, and Party officials for consciously and cynically exploiting
psychiatry's potential to discredit and repress dissent. They have cast the
dilemma of Soviet psychiatry as a cog in the "Evil Empire" conception of
Soviet behavior-as both proof and consequence of the classic post-war
conservative vision of aggressive Soviet intentions.313
This approach has animated not only the bulk of the literature on the
matter, but also most of Western activism. Exponents of this vision have
played the pre-eminent role in shaping the international response, most
notably in the two principal international fora that have focused on the
issue, the World Psychiatric Association and the United Nations Human
Rights Commission.
1. The World Psychiatric Association (WPA)
The WPA, a loose amalgam of national psychiatric societies formed in
1961 to advance international professional exchange, first encountered
the issue of Soviet psychiatrists' political role at its 1971 World Congress
in Mexico City. Only a few months had passed since the appearance in
the West of the firmest evidence yet that Soviet psychiatrists systemati-
cally interned dissenters who were sane by Western standards.314 In
March 1971, a French human rights group had released copies of a
number of Soviet psychiatric reports on dissenters obtained by Vladimir
Bukovsky. Psychiatrists, convinced that the Bukovsky documents pro-
vided compelling evidence of Soviet abuse, attempted to raise the issue in
313. The "devil theory," it seems, is not only popular in the West. See Reich, Believe It or
Not, Half the Soviet People Seem to Believe Americans Are Evil, L.A. Times, July 12, 1983, § 2,
at 5, col. 1.
314. Sporadic reports of forced hospitalization of dissenters had reached the West in the
late 1960's. In 1970, the issue began to receive wide attention when noted biologist Zhores
Medvedev was psychiatrically interned, Pyotr Grigorenko's description of his psychiatric en-
counters, see supra note 7, was published in the West, and Vladimir Bukovsky recounted his
hospital experiences in a CBS television news interview. See S. BLOCH & P. REDDAWAY,
supra note 5, at 65-78.
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Mexico City. However, due to (1) widespread doubts that these docu-
ments were so compelling (or even genuine), (2) intimations that the So-
viet delegation would walk out if the issue won a spot on the Congress'
agenda, and (3) fears that the intrusion of "politics" could jeopardize the
organization's scientific mission, the WPA Secretary-General interpreted
ambiguous by-law provisions to forestall official airing of the issue.315
At the next WPA Congress, however, activists committed to a con-
frontational, "simple evil" approach won three victories. First, by a nar-
row margin, over the objections of moderates who urged an exploratory
dialogue with Russian psychiatrists, delegates to the 1977 Honolulu Con-
gress voted to condemn the Soviets. 316 Second, the Congress adopted
without opposition 31 7 a platitudinous code of ethics. The code provisions
bearing on allegations of Soviet abuses illustrate the implausibility of the
premise that delineation of the outer boundaries of proper conduct can
be accomplished objectively, through world-wide application of "ac-
cepted scientific knowledge and ethical principles.1318
The code proscribes compulsory treatment "unless, because of mental
illness, the patient cannot form a judgment as to what is in his or her best
interest and without which treatment serious impairment is likely to oc-
cur to the patient or others. ' 319 This test, ironically, closely tracks the
mental illness and causality requirements of the Soviet and A.L.I. crimi-
nal responsibility tests,320 as well as the dangerousness requirements of
Soviet and American civil commitment standards. 321 The test is thus
subject to conflicting value choices, veiled behind different conceptions of
315. Id. at 86-93. See also Leigh, The Psychiatrist and Political Dissidents, 10 BULL. AM.
PSYCHIATRY & L. 227, 228 (1982) (former Secretary-General of the WPA defends his 1971
contention that WPA governing statutes and by-laws did not specifically provide for action
against a member society for alleged abuse of psychiatry for political reasons).
316. The resolution of condemnation stated:
That the WPA take note of the abuse of psychiatry for political purposes and that it
condemn those practices in all countries in which they occur and call upon the profes-
sional organizations of psychiatrists in those countries to renounce and expunge those
practices from their countries, and that the WPA implement this Resolution in the first
instance in reference to the extensive evidence of the systematic abuse of psychiatry for
political purposes in the USSR.
Quoted in S. BLOCH & P. REDDAWAY, supra note 2, at 47. A majority of national societies
voted against the resolution, including all the Eastern bloc societies, the Scandinavian societies,
and a large majority of Third World member societies. But under the WPA's weighted voting
scheme (which reflected both the size of each national society and its dues payments), "yes"
votes from Western and several Third World members sufficed for a 90 to 88 vote majority.
See id. at 45-60 (recounting the WPA delegates' consideration and passage of this resolution
from the perspective of two delegates who were active in the campaign for a condemnation
vote).
317. Id. at 48.
318. The Declaration of Hawaii, 1983, reprinted in id. at 233, 234.
319. Id.
320. See supra text accompanying notes 88-94.
321. See supra text accompanying notes 174-77.
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mental illness, causality, and dangerousness (or "impairment"). More-
over, the code declares:
The psychiatrist must never use his professional possibilities to violate the
dignity or human rights of any individual or group and should never let
inappropriate personal desires, feelings, prejudices or beliefs interfere with
the treatment. The psychiatrist must on no account utilize the tools of his
profession, once the absence of psychiatric illness has been established. 322
This proscription is even more obviously studded with unresolved, value-
laden problems of definition. Nowhere does the code articulate concep-
tions of "mental illness," "causality," and "impairment"-or of "dig-
nity," "rights," and "inappropriate prejudices." Nor does the code
reflect an awareness that such conceptions may vary sharply among cul-
tures, as the Soviet experience suggests.323 The fact that both Western
and Soviet delegates approved the code is compelling evidence that it
begs the key questions of definition.
Third, advocates of the confrontational, "simple evil" line won the
delegates' approval for a resolution creating a committee to investigate
cases of alleged abuse.324 Designed to evaluate individual cases by apply-
ing non-Soviet (in fact, Western) principles of practice, this panel was ill-
prepared to address two tougher, prior dilemmas: (1) how and why So-
viet and Western principles are so different, and (2) the significance of the
differences, and the reasons behind them, for the development of interna-
tional restrictions on the political roles of psychiatry.
Eastern bloc objections and bureaucratic wrangling delayed the start
of the committee's work for more than two years, and the Soviets' failure
to respond to the panel's requests for materials on alleged cases of abuse
thwarted its investigative efforts.325 For advocates of the confrontational
line, the lack of Soviet cooperation along with the arrests that eliminated
the Moscow-based Working Commission, 326 became a rallying point for
more militant action. The rhetorical response from Soviet psychiatric
leaders-continued insistence that interned dissenters were mentally ill
by objective diagnostic standards, mixed with accusations that those who
questioned Soviet psychiatric ethics were malicious slanderers, cold war-
riors, and even Zionists327 -hardly strengthened the moderates' case. By
322. Declaration of Hawaii, supra note 318, at 235.
323. The code's preamble does allude to "great differences in cultural backgrounds, and in
legal, social, and economic conditions. . . ." d at 233. But nowhere does the code acknowl-
edge the possibility that these differences render incoherent the code's attempt to establish
"minimal ... ethical standards of the psychiatric profession" worldwide. Id.
324. S. BLOCH & P. REDDAWAY, supra note 2, at 67-71.
325. Id. at 111-33.
326. See supra note 9.
327. Reich, supra note 177, at 22.
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the end of 1982, nine WPA member societies from Western nations, rep-
resenting an estimated 160 out of 315 votes, had approved resolutions
calling for action at the 1983 World Congress to oust or suspend the
Soviet society.328 On January 31, 1983, amidst a rising tide of Kremlin
hostility toward external critics, the Soviets preempted such a move with
their sudden withdrawal from the WPA.329
Western hardliners in the WPA claimed triumph, restrained only by
their regrets that the "enemy" had fallen on his sword, rather than be
slain. They voiced hope that their version of Western resolve would en-
gender Soviet feelings of humiliation, prompting high officials to sack
Snezhnevsky as they once did Lysenko and to release dissenters from
mental hospitals in an effort to regain international respect.330 But the
results so far have been an escalation of vituperative press blasts at critics
of Soviet psychiatry,331 a virtual cutoff of dialogue between Soviet and
Western psychiatrists, and diminished Western influence in individual
cases now that Soviet psychiatrists have little left to lose in the interna-
tional community. There are no hints either that the position of
Snezhnevsky and his deputies is under attack or that psychiatric intern-
ments are decreasing.
2. The United Nations Human Rights Commission
Developments in the United Nations Human Rights Commission have
been far less dramatic. Yet the approach taken by the United States and
by Britain, the principal activists on the issue among the Commission's
forty-three member states, has been similarly rooted in a "simple evil"
conception of the problem. Prior to 1981, the Commission had not spe-
cifically considered charges of political abuse of psychiatry. The closest
the Commission had come to the issue was a 1977 vote to charge its
Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of
Minorities with the task of developing principles for the protection of
328. S. BLOCH & P. REDDAWAY, supra note 2, at 194.
329. See Letter of Resignation from the U.S.S.R.'s All-Union Society of Neuropathologists
and Psychiatrists, Jan. 31,1983, reprinted in id. at 249-52 (blaming U.S. State Dep't and Amer-
ican and British member societies for a "slanderous," "blatantly political," and "cold war"
campaign). The Soviet resignation was followed by Czech and Bulgarian withdrawals a few
months later. Cuba resigned at the July 1983 World Congress in Vienna, but other Eastern
bloc member societies remained in the organization. See id. at 206-14. See also Morozov &
Lukacher, We Condemn This Unseemly Activity, MEDrrINSKAYA GAZETA, Mar. 25, 1983,
reprinted in CURRENT DIG. SOV. PREss, Apr. 27, 1983, at I (bitterly attacking Western "slan-
der campaign" and defending Soviet diagnoses as more than "punishment for non-
conformity").
330. S. BLOCH & P. REDDAWAY, supra note 2, at 231-32.




involuntarily committed patients.33 2 But in 1981, the Reagan Adminis-
tration's new U.N. appointees began to use the Commission aggressively
as a forum for excoriation of Soviet psychiatric practices.333 British dele-
gates supported this effort, albeit adopting a less strident tone.
In the face of strong Eastern bloc opposition, along with Third World
antipathy, the Reagan Administration's initiative met with little suc-
cess.33 4 In 1982, the Commission did pass a resolution stating, without
naming any particular countries, that "detention of persons in mental
institutions on account of their political views or on other non-medical
grounds is a violation of their human rights. ' 33 5 This language failed to
332. 62 U.N. ESCOR, Supp. (No. 6) at ch. xxi, § A, U.N. Doe. E/5927. After prolonged
internal dispute, the Subcommission voted in 1980 to delegate to a Special Rapporteur, Erica-
Irene Daes of Greece, the preparation of a set of draft guidelines on involuntary psychiatric
detention and treatment. Report of the Sessional Working Group on the Question of Persons
Detained on the Grounds of Mental Ill-Health, Subcomm'n on Prevention of Discrimination
and Protection of Minorities, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1982/17 (1982). Ms. Daes submitted
a report on worldwide commitment practices, along with proposed guidelines, to the Sessional
Working Group (a panel of experts appointed by the Subcommission to consider the guide-
lines) in 1982. See E. Daes, Guidelines, Principles, and Guarantees for the Protection of Per-
sons Detained on Grounds of Mental Ill-Health or Suffering from Mental Disorder,
Subcommittee on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, U.N. Doc. E/
CN.4/Sub.2/1982/16 (1982). But the Working Group has so far been unable to agree on the
guidelines, and the process that began in 1977 now appears to have reached a stalemate.
333. In their public statements over the last several years, U.S. representatives have con-
demned Soviet psychiatric theory as "pseudo-scientific" doctrine, crafted to enable "the Soviet
secret police" to regain the Stalinist "power of totally arbitrary arrest and detention." State-
ment by Richard Schifter, United States Representative (Oct. 28, 1981) (Press Release USUN
88(81) from U.S. Mission to the U.N.) (copy on file with the Yale Journal of International
Law). Behind the scenes, American delegates have pressed for a Commission vote to condemn
the Soviets by name and to create a U.N.-linked panel to investigate cases of alleged abuse.
Interviews with officials of the U.S. Dep't of State and U.S. Mission to the U.N., in Washing-
ton, D.C. and New York City respectively (1984). The panel, like the WPA review committee,
would apply Western standards in considering allegations, without any special focus on the
dilemmas of cultural relativity in psychiatric practice.
334. For most Third World members, the "social and economic rights" matter of channel-
ing technology to achieve economic development without disrupting traditional values eclipses
psychiatric abuse in significance. Both issues fall within the scope of the Commission's
Agenda Item 15-the implications of science and technology for human rights. In their public
statements, Third World delegates have tended to mention the psychiatric abuse question only
in passing, if at all, while focusing more closely on technology's possibilities for and threats to
their respective societies. See, e.g., U.N. Comm'n on Human Rights, Summary Record of the
28th Meeting (First Part), at 14-16, U.N. Doe. E/CN.4/1984/SR.28 (1984) (statement by
India); and U.N. Comm'n on Human Rights, Summary Record of the 28th Meeting (Second
Part), at 2-3, U.N. Doe. E/CN.4/1984/SR.28/Add.1 (1984) (statement by Congo). Eastern
bloc representatives have also given much attention to this latter issue. Thus, there may be at
least a tacit alliance between the Soviet bloc and most Third World nations: in return for
Soviet bloc support in the social and economic rights sphere, Third World states take a less-
than-aggressive stance on the psychiatry issue. Under the WPA's weighted voting system,
Third World support was not enough for the Soviets to defeat a condemnation resolution. But
within the Commission on Human Rights, a one member/one vote system has made a decisive
difference.
335. U.N. Human Rights Commission Resolution 1982/6.
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address the possibility that all purported "medical grounds" for deten-
tion have a political content, and that the fundamental problem for those
concerned with political abuse of psychiatry may be to distinguish be-
tween internationally acceptable and intolerable political content. Over-
all, the confrontational efforts of American delegates to the Commission
since 1981 appear to have merely fueled passions without developing in-
sight.336 It is ironic that this is precisely the criticism Reagan Adminis-
tration officials have leveled at many Western critics of human rights
violations in right-wing states. 337 The ideological selectiveness of recent
U.S. government calls for "the light of intellectual insight"3 38 in the
human rights field hardly enhances the moral force of its U.N. delegates'
condemnation of the Soviet psychiatric "evil."
B. Towards a New Activism
The international response to Soviet psychiatric internment of dissi-
dents has, in short, been animated by many Western activists' confronta-
tional, "simple evil" conception of the problem. Yet, as this Article has
attempted to demonstrate, that conception suffers from fundamental
flaws. The KGB and other security organs, it is true, probably find the
"psychiatric shunt"3 39 a convenient path around post-Stalinist require-
ments that even crimes of politics and ideology be prosecuted in accord-
ance with "socialist legality." But the practice has much deeper,
intertwined roots in Soviet law, psychiatric theory, bureaucratic struc-
ture, and culture.
336. The U.S. policy of excoriation without an attempt to analyze and to understand may
have only made it easier for Soviet political authorities and psychiatric leaders to dismiss West-
ern criticism as mere cold war propaganda. See, e.g., U.N. Comm'n on Human Rights, Sum-
mary Record of the 28th Meeting (First Part), at 8-12, U.N. Doe. E/CN.4/1984/SR.28 (1984)
(statement by Soviet Union). On the other hand, Soviet rhetoric has seemed no more oriented
toward achieving insight into the vast gulf between Soviet and Western psychiatric practices.
In their public statements, Soviet diplomats and psychiatric spokesmen have resolutely insisted
that interned dissidents are ill by objective, scientific standards. See supra note 329. And
when a group of visiting Norwegian psychiatrists queried leading Soviet psychiatrists in 1982
about the possibility that their different conceptions of mental illness could reflect sharp social
and political differences, the Soviets brushed aside this line of dialogue. The Norwegians hy-
pothesized three explanations for this-lack of insight into the possibility of diagnostic relativ-
ity, conscious self-censorship, and commitment to a biological vision of mental dysfunction. S.
BLOCH & P. REDDAWAY, supra note 2, at 168-70.
337. The "major shortcoming of far too many human rights groups," Assistant Secretary
of State for Human Rights Elliott Abrams wrote, is "an appalling shallowness of analysis. The
unique historical, social, and geopolitical conditions of a particular country are often simply
ignored. In many cases. . . this intellectual failure is matched by political failure." Abrams,
The Myopia of Human Rights Advocates, N.Y. Times, Aug. 10, 1984, at A25, col. 1 (criticizing
critics of human rights abuses in Turkey).
338. Id.
339. See generally M. Field, supra note 47.
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The Soviet legal test of criminal responsibility invites psychiatrists to
veil their value choices about moral accountability behind technical
jargon, and Soviet criminal procedure makes it easy for them to do so.
Soviet rules for civil commitment make plain the principle that behavior
which challenges individuals or institutions in authority is per se a sign of
socially dangerous mental disturbance. These rules, when administra-
tively applied without opportunity for judicial or other independent re-
view, provide virtually no means for interned individuals (or their
families and friends) to challenge their fates.
Soviet psychiatrists, meanwhile, have developed and applied doctrinal
tools that reflect a sense that the dissenter's defiance of authority is in-
comprehensibly bizarre. With the triumph of Pavlovian theory several
decades ago, Soviet psychiatry won wide credibility as a Leninist agent of
revolutionary activism and, therefore, a powerful instrument for the
sculpting of a new society. The rise of Snezhnevsky's genetic spectrum
model of schizophrenia to pre-eminence in the 1960's reflected a dampen-
ing of revolutionary hope that crime-including dissent-would wither
away. But the theory also squared with the Soviets' persistence concern-
ing the development of socialism. Moreover, the theory's premise of a
genetic link between even mild nonconformity and malignant psychosis
created an aura of scientific legitimacy around the historically deep-set
Russian feeling that nonconformist behavior is something of an anath-
ema. Dissent was a product of genetic disease, not an expression of free
moral choice, and psychiatrists were to discharge their forensic duties
accordingly.
Were there convincing proof that most Soviet psychiatrists cynically
view this psychiatric model as charlatanism in service of repression, yet
obediently or actively apply it in conscious disregard for their sensed du-
ties as healers, the "simple evil" theory could not be easily dismissed.
But no such evidence has been presented. It is more plausible-though
again compelling proof does not exist-that the system of psychiatric be-
lief and behavior that permits the diagnosis and commitment of dissent-
ers is so entrenched because it is so credible-scientifically, culturally,
and emotionally-to Russian practitioners. For the individual clinician
or researcher, this credibility is continually reinforced by the bureau-
cratic system of incentives, overt and subtle, within which his career
unfolds.
The flaws of the "simple evil" theory, however, do not automatically
imply that the rhetoric of simple castigation is an improper strategy for
activists in the international arena. Conceivably, international moral
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condemnation could drive home to Soviet doctors the point that, how-
ever genuine their faith in the ethics of the Soviet psychiatric response to
dissent, it is reviled by the world community. This sober realization
might inspire reassessment of current practice. There is no evidence,
though, that any reassessment is under way.
Furthermore, the rhetoric of "simple evil" obscures the reality that
many things that trouble us about Soviet practices have problematic ana-
logues in the West. The A.L.I. test of criminal responsibility, commonly
applied in this country, closely tracks the Soviet test and similarly invites
psychiatrists to veil decisive moral choices behind conclusory labels. 340
"Dangerousness" as a criterion for civil commitment is likewise open to
Western doctors' politically-laden conceptions of what hazards should be
taken into account. Genetic theories akin to Snezhnevsky's are on the
rise in the West, with similarly troubling implications for the rights and
dignity of those found to have a "hereditary taint." Bureaucratic sys-
tems of career training and development nurture in young professionals a
cautious reluctance to analyze critically the teachings and prejudices of
their superiors. Over time, this reluctance tends to harden into uncritical
acceptance. Finally, psychiatric diagnosis and treatment in any society
are rooted in homeostatic notions of health as adaptation to external cir-
cumstances, and thus tend both to reflect and to conserve dominant
values. 341
If international dialogue on the issue of psychiatry's political role, in
the Soviet Union or elsewhere, is to generate illumination, and not
merely friction, these component problems need to be explored. We need
to understand how, in the peculiar, anti-pluralistic cultural and ideologi-
cal context of the Soviet Union, the universal vulnerabilities of psychiatry
and law have combined to create a political style of clinical practice re-
pugnant to much of the rest of the world. An international dialogue, in
vigorous pursuit of this sort of understanding, would have value not only
as a precise tool for the identification of what may have gone wrong in
the Soviet Union. It could also be a first step toward the development of
an international consensus on an irreducible minimum of things mental
health professionals ought not to do to people to achieve political ends,
whatever the social and cultural context. Even if no such consensus is
ever achieved, a continuing international dialogue on the critical political
questions at the interface of psychiatry and law in every society would
340. See supra text accompanying notes 89-93.




raise consciousness on the possibilities for abuse. Achieving such height-
ened consciousness itself could strengthen the hand of national activists
concerned with psychiatry's potential for abuse of individual rights and
dignity.
At least one "simple evil" theorist has asserted that any explanation of
Soviet practices that acknowledges the possibility of "sincere acceptance"
of official psychiatric doctrine "exculpates" the Soviets from charges that
they have acted unethically. 342 This claim evinces a peculiar conception
of ethical responsibility. Surely, explanation need not always require ex-
culpation, for the psychiatrist no less than for the criminal defendants
she examines, if we are to preserve the principle of "the responsibility of
the doer for his deed. '343 But to preserve this precept in the face of the
power of deterministic explanation to rationalize and "justify" every con-
ceivable human brutality, we must formulate and affirm values.
The "simple evil" theorists implicitly do affirm values, under the guise
of their claim that Soviet psychiatrists violate objective principles of psy-
chiatric diagnosis and ethics. The idea of objective principles, though, is
an oxymoron. All principles reflect underlying values.344 Thus, moral
castigation of the Soviets for disregarding "objective" psychiatric "truth"
is uninsightful at best and disingenuous at worst. We should openly ac-
knowledge and explore in international dialogue what is culturally rela-
tive, conservative, and value-laden about concepts of mental illness,
responsibility, and dangerousness. And we should candidly discuss the
values underlying our ethical precepts. By so doing, our critique of So-
viet practices would be less vulnerable to charges of hypocrisy and there-
fore more compelling.
342. See generally Chodoff, supra note 86.
343. See supra note 30.
344. See generally R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 1-144 (1975).
